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A Comparative Perspective on the
First Amendment:
Free Speech, Militant Democracy, and the
Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred

Constitutional Value in Germany
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.
Since Brandenburg v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Courthasprotectedracistspeech
underthe FreeSpeech Clause ofthe FirstAmendment. Criticsofthis approachroutinely invoke
the existence of hate speech regulationsin other democraciesas compelling evidence thut such
rules can comfortably coexist with a meaningful commitment to the freedom of speech.
Germany,in particular,often receives favorable mention as an example of a nation that has
successfully integratedhate speech regulations and a strong commitment to the freedom of
speech. Promotingequalityand encouragingthe participationofracialand ethnic minorities in
the project of democratic self-government certainly constitute important social goals.
A ccordingly,legalreforms designedto achieve these objectives deserve careful considenition.
Even grantingthe importance of the equalityproject,however, Germanyprovidesa poor
model for the United States to follow GermanysFederalConstitutionalCourtsubordinatesthe
freedom ofexpression to a remarkabledegree to advance otherconstitutionalvalues, dgnity and
personal honor routinely take precedence over fire speech claims in German constitutional
decisions. To some exten4 the ConstitutionalCourts approach simply reflects the Basic Law
itself- the Basic Law places human ahignity, free development of ones personaity,and the
protection ofpersonalhonor above free speech in an overt hierarchyof values. Moreover the
Basic Law sets lbrth concrete limits on the freedom of speech, including limits designed to
protectpersonal honor and safeguard the democratic social order The Basic Law, however,
provides only a parnalexplanation. Broaderculturaltradtionsin Germanyalso help to explain
why digmty and personal honor hold a preferred place within contemporary German
constitutionallaw
A Comparative Perspective on the First Amendment: Free Speech, Militant Democracy,
and the Primacy of Dignity as a Preferred Constitutional Value in Germany argues that the
German example does not really support the aigument that hate speech regulations can easily
coexist with a strong commitment to protect the freedom of speech. The degree to which
German law subordinatesfire speech claims would be dfffIcul4 if not impossible, to reconcile
with both legal and culturalnorms favoring speech rights in the United States. Moreover,the
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importance of cultmual values in explaining the German approach also suggests that importing
Germany s regime foriegulatinghate speech mightbe a difficul ifnot impossible, undertaking
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Critics of the United States Supreme Court's protection of racist
speech point to the experience of other constitutional democracies in
support of their position that proscriptions against hate speech are not
necessarily inconsistent with a meaningful commitment to the freedom
of speech. For example, Professor Richard Delgado has argued that
"Western democracies that have enacted hate speech laws, such as
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and the Netherlands, have
scarcely suffered a diminution of respect for free speech."' Based on
1.
Richard Delgado, Are Hate-Speech Rules ConstitutionalHeresy? A Reply to
Steven Gey, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 865, 874 (1998); see also Mari J. Matsuda, PublicResponse to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victims Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2346-48 (1989)
(arguing that hate speech regulations have worked in several industrial democracies).
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the adoption and enforcement of hate speech laws in Western Europe
and elsewhere, he suggests that "it is evidently possible to regulate the
more vicious forms of race-hate speech, while remaining committed to
free expression."2'
Other proponents of hate speech regulation also tend to
characterize such regimes in foreign nations as largely successful.
Professor Kathleen Mahoney observes that "[i]f one looks to the
international community, there is a recognition that racist hate
propaganda is integral to the perpetuation of racism, that it is
illegitimate speech and is properly subject to control under law."3 In a
similar vein, Professor Michel Rosenfeld reports that "[i]n the Western
European democracies, the speech of racists, Communists, Fascists,
and Nazis has been successfully outlawed."
Essentially, proponents of hate speech regulations claim that a
limited proscription against certain targeted racial insults can exist in a
regime that is otherwise quite tolerant of free speech. "Indeed, the
experiences of Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands--countries whose commitment to freedom of inquiry
arguably is comparable to that of the United States-imply that limited
regulation of hate speech does not invariably cause deterioration of the
respect accorded free speech."5 Rather than a gross abridgement of a
fundamental right, "[c]itizens seem to regard anti-hate-speech laws as
limited exceptions comparable to libel or official-secret rules
necessary to preserve a decent society. '
Perhaps it might be possible to operationalize a regime of hate
speech laws in a fashion that does not trample core speech rights. But,
before endorsing any particular regulatory scheme, one should take
some care to examine how it operates and the larger legal context of
which it is a part. At least in the case of Germany, it is very difficult to
claim plausibly that "limited regulation of hate speech does not
invariably cause deterioration of the respect accorded free speech." '7

2.
Richard Delgado, Campus Antracism Rules: Consttutional Narmves in
Collision, 85 Nw.
U. L. REv. 343,371 (1991).
3.
Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech. Affirmaton orContradictionofFreedom of
Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 789, 803.
4.
Michel Rosenfeld, Extrmist Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 1457, 1457 (1987) (reviewing LEE C. BOLL1NGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH iN AMERICA (1986)).

5.
Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifing Balance: Freedom of Expression
andJate-SpeechRestriction, 78 IoWA L. REV. 737, 742 (1993).

6.
7.

Id.
Id.
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This Article examines some of the principal free speech decisions
of the Federal Constitutional Court, the highest constitutional court in
Germany. Free speech represents the Rodney Dangerfield of
fundamental rights in Germany: it does not get much respect.
Importantly, proscriptions against hate speech are only a small part of
the overall picture. The legal and cultural milieu that gave rise to
Germany's laws against hate speech also have given rise to a variety of
laws, policies, and doctrines that subordinate the freedom of
expression in favor of other values, notably including human dignity,
reputation, and honor.
Part I examines the history of the Basic Law, Germany's
constitution, and its protection of the freedom of speech. Part II
considers the importance of human dignity, which enjoys an absolute
primacy in the Basic Law's "objective order of values" Part III
explores the content and viewpoint based laws that Germany has
enacted to preserve its "militant democracy." Finally, Part IV
considers whether hate speech laws and proscriptions on
antidemocratic values represent an effective means of securing the
rights of racial and ethnic minorities. At least arguably, access to
citizenship-and, by implication, voting rights-would better advance
equality values in Germany. The Article concludes that, although
consideration of Germany's approach to hate speech is a fascinating
subject for comparative law study, Germany's approach breaks far too
radically with important free speech values to provide a plausible
model for speech regulation in the United States.
Advocates of the adoption of hate speech regulations in the
United States might well be correct in suggesting that such laws need
only infringe free speech rights at the margins. The German example,
however, suggests that such regimes can reflect a radically different
hierarchy of values. In Germany, free speech is a (very) poor cousin of
human dignity. Any effort to use Germany as a template for the
regulation of racist speech in the United States must address this
important fact.
I.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC LAW AND GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM

Following the end of World War II, the portion of Germany under
the control of the Western Alliance worked to establish a functioning
constitutional democracy. One of the primary bulwarks of this new
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democratic order was the adoption of the Basic Law.8 On May 8,
1949, precisely four years to the day after the collapse of the Third
Reich, the postwar German government enacted the Basic Law.9 The
drafters intended for it to serve merely as a temporary measure for the
Western Sector until a formal constitution could be written and
enacted for a unified Germany."° The Basic Law took effect on May
23, 1949, and has remained Germany's foundational legal document
ever since."
Notwithstanding hopes for a quick reunification process,
Germany remained divided for some forty years. Accordingly, the
permanent "Constitution" that the Basic Law's framers envisioned
never came into being. In fact, the Basic Law, over time, itself took on
the character and function of a constitution.
Following the
reunification of Germany in 1990, the Basic Law became the basis for
a new, democratic government for a united Germany. The Basic Law,
drafted and enacted as a temporary measure, finally enjoyed an official
status that reflected what for many years had been its de facto status:
constitutional blueprint for democratic self-government in Germany.
Although the Basic Law protects the freedom of speech, it does
so to a much more limited degree than does the Free Speech Clause of
the First Amendment. The reasons for this are many and varied.
Perhaps most importantly, free speech simply is not the most important
constitutional value in the German legal order; instead, pursuant to the
first clause of the Basic Law, human dignity holds this position.'3
Article 1 of the Basic Law "is both 'the supreme constitutional
principle' and a fundamental right."'4 Accordingly, when cases present
8.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] (CONSTrrrUTION] (F.R.G.). For a brief history of the Basic
Law, including its creation and adoption, see DAvtD P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 8-24 (1994), and DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 7-10, 30-49 (2d
ed. 1997). All citations and quotations to the Basic Law are taken from the English
translation in the appendix to the Currie text, unless otherwise noted.
9.
See Ernst Benda, The Protection ofHwnan Dignity(Article 1 of the BasicLaw),
53 SMU L. REv. 443, 445-46 (2000). As one commentator noted at the time of the vote, "I
am not sure how to grasp the symbolic meaning of this date. This 8th of May, in essence, is
the most tragic and questionable paradox in our history. Why? Because we have, at the same
time, been redeemed and destroyed." Id. at 445 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
PARLAMENTARISCHER RAT, Sten. Ber. (10 Sitzung S. 139), at 136).
10.
See id.
11.
See id
12.
CompareGGart. 5, with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
13.
See GG art. 1(1) ("Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the
duty of all state authority.").
14.
See Benda, supra note 9, at 444.
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facts in which human dignity and free speech collide, free speech
usually must give way.
A second reason for the weaker version of free speech in
Germany relates to Germany's status as a "militant democracy."15 Free
speech, including core political speech, has definite limits in Germany:
speech which has as its aim the destruction of democratic selfgovernment enjoys absolutely no constitutional protection under the
Basic Law. 6 Obviously, the history of National Socialist dictatorship
under Adolf Hitler colors the German judiciary's view of the relative
importance of free speech. Indeed, the Basic Law itself prohibits
political parties who wish to disestablish democratic self-government
in Germany. 7 Accordingly, an entire category of core political speech
activity enjoys no protection whatsoever in the German constitutional
system.
Finally, the Basic Law limits the right to free speech directly, by
inviting balancing of other social interests against free expression
claims.'8 The First Amendment, by way of contrast, makes no
provision for rights balancing; on its face, the right to free speech is
absolute. As one might predict, the weighing exercise mandated by the
text of the Basic Law does not always redound in favor of free speech
claimants.
In Germany, then, one finds a nation that is committed to the
freedom of speech, but only within carefully circumscribed limits, and
only to the extent that the commitment to free speech does not conflict
with other constitutional values (including human dignity and the
preservation of the democratic order). One would be mistaken,
however, to dismiss Germany's approach to freedom of expression as
self-evidently misguided or insufficiently sensitive to the value of free
speech in a democratic society. Germany has simply weighed the
various social costs and benefits very differently than has the United
States. Whether Germany has struck an appropriate balance remains
to be seen, but a careful student of the field should not automatically
15.
See generally KOMMERS, supra note 8, at 37-38 (discussing the impact of
Germany's classification as a "militant democracy").
16.
SeeGG art. 21(2).
17.
See id ("Parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents,
seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order to endanger the existence of the
Federal Republic of Germany are unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall
decide on the question of unconstitutionality.").
18.
See id art. 5(2) ("These rights find their limits in the provisions of general
statutes, in statutory provisions for the protection of youth, and in the right to respect for
personal honor.").
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assume that labeling the German system "different" is simply a polite
way of labeling it "wrong."
A.

The BasicLaw andFreedom ofExpression

The Basic Law contains several provisions that protect speech
activity. Although Article 5 is probably the most important of these
provisions, it is worth noting that the Basic Law expressly protects
speech activity in a variety of forms and contexts. For example,
academic freedom enjoys textual protection 9 and, accordingly, the
Federal Constitutional Court does not have to infer its existence within
a more generic free speech guarantee."0
Another major difference between the Basic Law and the First
Amendment is the Basic Law's textual inclusion of express limits on
the scope of free speech rights. The United States Supreme Court has
found that the First Amendment's free speech guarantee is not, in any
meaningful sense of the word, absolute.2' It has, accordingly, examined
the government's claim for a need to regulate speech on a case-by-case
basis and weighed the government's asserted interests against the
values advanced by the free speech guarantee. This balancing exercise
has taken place despite the seemingly unqualified language of the First
Amendment itself. In Germany, by way of contrast, the Federal
Constitutional Court has a textual mandate to balance some interests
against the free speech guarantee."
Finally, all constitutional rights are not equal in Germany. The
Basic Law establishes an "objective ordering of values" that the
Federal Constitutional Court declares and enforces.23 As Professor
19.
See id art. 5(3).
20.
Cf Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967) (finding that academic freedom enjoys constitutional protection as a penumbral
right associated with the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment).
21.
See, e.g.,
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(noting that free speech rights are fundamental, but not absolute).
22.
SeeGG art.5(2).
23.
See Lith, BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958), translated in 2 DECISIONS OF THE
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICT-FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT-FEDERAL REPUBLIC
(1958) OF GERMANY (pt. 1), at 1 (1998) [hereinafter 2 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT]; see also Peter E. Quint, Free Speech andPivate Law i German
ConstitutionalTheory, 48 MD. L. REv. 247, 252-89 (1989) (discussing the Lith case). As
Professor Quint has stated the matter, the German Constitutional Court has
emphasized that the Basic Law establishes an "objective ordering of values," and
indicated that the introduction of this concept in constitutional doctrine represents a
fundamental strengthening of the effectiveness of the basic rights and a certain
extension of those rights beyond their traditional realm.
Quint, supra, at 261 (quoting Lfith internally).
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Edward Eberle has observed, "the Basic Law is a value-oriented
constitution that obligates the state to realize a set of objectively
ordered principles, rooted in justice and equality, that are designed to
restore the centrality of humanity to the social order, and thereby
secure a stable democratic society on this basis"24 Thus, even if one
successfully invokes one provision of the Basic Law, this may prove to
be an insufficient condition to avoid liability for speech activity when
another constitutional value is also in play. In particular, free speech
claims under Article 5 do not seem to do particularly well when
balanced against human dignity claims premised on Article 1.
The Basic Law attempts to enshrine permanently the balance
struck favoring dignity over freedom of speech, and favoring the
preservation of democracy over the exercise of free speech. In relevant
part, Article 79(3) provides that "Amendments of this Basic Law
affecting ... the basic principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall
be inadmissible."25 Article 1 establishes the primacy of human dignity
as a constitutional value, 6 and Article 20, which declares Germany to
be a "democratic and social federal state,' 2 7 charges all citizens to resist
efforts to "abolish that constitutional order."8 Just as Article V of the
United States Constitution attempts to preclude certain constitutional
changes, 29 Article 79(3) reflects an effort by the Framers of the Basic
Law to maintain in perpetuity the existing constitutional order."
B. Article 5' ProtectionofSpeech Activity
Article 5(1) of the Basic Law expressly protects the freedom of
expression. It provides that "[e]veryone has the right freely to express
and disseminate his opinion in speech, writing, and pictures and freely
to inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the
press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films are
guaranteed. There shall be no censorship."'"

24.

Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignify Pnvacy, and Personaliy in German and

American ConstitutionalLaw,1997 UTAH L. REv. 963, 967.
25. GG art. 79(3); see also CURRIE, supm note 8, at 10-11.
26.
SeeGG art. 1(1).
27. See id art. 20(1).
28.

Id art. 20(4).

29. See U.S. CONST. art. V (permitting amendments to the Constitution, except that
"no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate").
30. SeeGG art. 79(3).
31.

Id. art. 5(1).
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Article 5 also protects academic freedom, stating that "[a]rt and
science, research, and teaching shall be free."32 Thus, the Basic Law
enshrines the freedom of speech as a constitutionally protected right in
the Federal Republic of Germany.
Article 5's guarantees are, however, subject to some significant
textual constraints. Perhaps most importantly, Article 5 limits the
scope of freedom of speech by inviting judicial balancing of the right
against other governmental objectives: "These rights find their limits
in the provisions of general statutes, in statutory provisions for the
protection of youth, and in the right to respect for personal honor."33
Moreover, the right to academic freedom does not extend to advocacy
of violent overthrow of the government: "Freedom of teaching shall
not release anyone from his allegiance to the constitution."3
Separate provisions of the Basic Law protect the freedom of
assembly and the freedom of association. -Article 8 states that "[a]ll
Germans have the right to assemble peaceably and unarmed without
prior notification or permission."3' The right to assembly in open air
meetings "may be restricted by or pursuant to statute." 6 Article 9
provides that "[a]ll Germans shall have the right to form associations
and corporations."' 7 As with Articles 5 and 8, however, this protection
does not extend to groups that seek the overthrow of the democratic
constitutional order: "Associations whose purposes or activities
conflict with criminal statutes or that are directed against the
constitutional order or the concept of international understanding are
prohibited."38 Finally, Article 17 provides that "[e]veryone has the right
individually or jointly with others to address written requests or
complaints to the competent agencies and to parliaments."
With respect to the creation and operation of political parties, the
Basic Law declares that "[t]he political parties shall participate in the
formation of the political will of the people" and "may be freely
established."''
However, German political parties must maintain
organizational structures that "conform to democratic principles."''
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. art. 5(3).
Id.art. 5(2).
Id. art. 5(3).
Id. art. 8(1).
Id. art. 8(2).
Id. art. 9(1).
Id. art. 9(2).
Id art. 17.
Id art. 21(1).
Id
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Finally, "[p]arties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their
adherents, seek to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or
to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany are
unconstitutional." 2 When questions arise regarding the consistency of
a party's platform with these requirements, "[t]he Federal
Constitutional Court shall decide on the question of unconstitutionality.' ' 3
The Basic Law contains redundancies that emphasize the
importance of protecting the "democratic basic order." Even though
the articles conferring specific speech rights on the citizenry expressly
exclude speech aimed at overthrowing the government, several
independent clauses repeat the rule that the exercise of rights enshrined
in the Basic Law does not extend to efforts to abolish democratic selfgovernment in Germany.
Article 18, for example, provides for forfeiture of basic rights,
including the rights set forth in Articles 5, 8, and 9, if a citizen
exercises those rights "in order to combat the free democratic basic
order.'" "Such forfeiture and the extent thereof shall be determined by
the Federal Constitutional Court." 5 Similarly, Article 20 provides that
"[t]he Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal
state'" and invites citizens to "resist any person or persons seeking to
abolish this constitutional order, should no other remedy be possible.'" 7
Thus, one need not even turn to the case law of the Federal
Constitutional Court to see the overtly limited scope of free speech in
Germany. Certain kinds of political speech are simply outside the
pale---even "core" political speech. A person or group advocating the
violent overthrow of the government does not enjoy any right to
advocate such action without facing both criminal and civil penalties."
This represents a marked break with the tradition in the United States,
as Brandenburgv Ohid and NAACP v
as represented by such cases
50
ClaiborneHardwareCo.

42. Id.art. 21(2).
43. Id.
44. Id.art. 18.
45. Id.
46. Id art. 20(1).
47. Id.art. 20(4).
48. See Communist Party Ban, BVerfGE 5, 85 (1956); see also KOMMERS, supra note
8, at 37-38, 222-24 (discussing the application of the Article 21 ban on antidemocratic
political parties).
49. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
50. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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But Article 5's textual limitations are not restricted just to speech
critical of the existing democratic constitutional order-Article 5 itself
invites regulations that protect the youth, protect personal honor, or
find expression in the general statutes." Depending on the exact
meaning of these express restrictions on the freedom of speech, the
scope of permissible comment could shrink even more. We come to
this point without engaging in the balancing exercise that applies when
rights enshrined in the Basic Law collide-as often happens, for
example, when a free speech exercise arguably offends the protection
of dignity set forth in Article 1.
Thus, without even getting beyond the text of the Basic Law, it
becomes very clear that the German conception of free speech is at
great variance with the conception that prevails in the United States.
Again, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Perhaps the United States
fails to value adequately the dangers that speech advocating violent
overthrow of the government represents. Perhaps the United States
Supreme Court also has failed to recognize sufficiently the relative
importance of personal honor or protection of youth. It is far too early
in the analysis to draw any firm conclusions. That said, a very
preliminary consideration of the issue establishes quickly that the
German conception of free speech radically departs from baseline
notions in the United States.
Another important distinction between the United States and
Germany involves the potential scope of constitutional rights. In the
United States, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
secure rights only against the government.52 No matter how egregious,
a private party's actions do not constitute a constitutional violation in
the absence of some nexus with the government. Accordingly, one
would not normally expect the Free Speech Clause to be invoked in an
antitrust case between two private corporations or in an employment
dispute involving a private employer's decision to discharge an
employee because of the employee's speech activities.53
51.
SeeGG art. 5(2).
52.
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Biarpatch:An Argument in Favorof
ConstitutionalMeta-Analysisin State Acion Determinations,94 MICH. L. REv. 302, 303-21
(1995).
53. For example, suppose that a high school operated by the Roman Catholic Church
fires a religion teacher after learning that the religion teacher belongs to NARAL (the
National Abortion Rights Action League). The decision to fire would not raise any serious
free speech issues, precisely because the high school, a private actor, is not obliged to respect
the First Amendment. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-38 (1982). A
county sheriff, on the other hand, could not engage in the same behavior; the First
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Some legal academics in the United States have argued that rather
than engage in state action analysis, the federal courts should simply
engage in overt rights balancing when conflicting constitutional claims
appear at bar.14 For example, if a group of nuns complained that the
local bishop denied them equal protection of the law on the basis of
gender, by refusing to employ them as priests, the district court judge
hearing the case would be required to weigh the nuns' interest in being
free of gender discrimination against the bishop's interest in enforcing
the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church regarding the sacrament
of Holy Orders. Under this approach, the fact that the bishop is not a
"state actor" would not preclude consideration of the nuns' equal
protection claim on the merits.
Professor Chemerinsky describes the state action doctrine as
"incoherent" and suggests that the federal courts apply the state action
doctrine strategically, by peeking at the merits, deciding whether they
wish to recognize the plaintiffs' claims, and rule accordingly on the
question of state action." In his view, it would be more intellectually
honest to balance the competing claims (assuming that the defendant
can assert some sort of constitutional privilege to engage in the
behavior that serves as the basis of the plaintiff's complaint). 6 In the
hypothetical, the bishop could probably assert a free exercise and free
association claim that trumps the nuns' claim to be free of gender
discrimination. The state actor status of the bishop would be entirely
irrelevant to the proper analysis of the merits.
In Germany, by way of contrast, there is no state action
requirement. The Basic Law permeates all social relations, and the
state actor status of a defendant does not prefigure the outcome of
cases. 7 In the specific context of freedom of expression, Professor
Eberle notes that the lack of a state action requirement probably
"reflects the belief that the real threats to expression in German society
come from private actors and social forces, and not from the state." 8
Thus, in the Liith case (discussed below), the German
Constitutional Court balanced a film producer's Article 5 right to free
Amendment would protect an employee who spoke out regarding a matter of public concern.
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388-92 (1987).
54. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has advocated such an approach. See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Rethindkng StateAction, 80 Nw.U. L. REv. 503, 503-11, 536-42 (1985).
at 503-07, 524-27, 535-57.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 537-39.
57. SeeNGEL G. FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 155-56 (2d ed. 1996).
58. Edward J.Eberle, Public Discoursein ContemporaryGermany,47 CASE W RES.
L. REv. 797, 813 (1997).
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expression against the free speech claims of the organizer of a boycott
against the film. 9 The state had made no effort to suppress the film in
question-the case presented a free speech claim raised as a defense to
an antiboycott claim (which also invoked the free speech principle). '
In deciding to apply the Basic Law's provisions to a dispute
between two private parties, the German Constitutional Court
articulated a doctrine of secondary effects: the Basic Law not only
works to disallow civil law provisions that transgress its guarantees,
but it also informs the substantive meaning of the civil code itself.
This is especially true with respect to the so-called "general
provisions" of the German civil code, which are intended to advance
sound public policies. As Professor Peter Quint has observed,
"[b]ecause the basic rights establish 'objective' values, then, those
rights must apply not only against the state exercising its authority
under public law; according to the Constitutional Court, basic rights
must also have an effect on the rules of private law which regulate
legal relations among individuals."61
It is certainly reasonable to suppose that the content of a given
law should be measured against the provisions of the Basic Law. The
United States Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v Sullivan, did
exactly this. Justice Brennan explained that,
[a]lthough this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.
It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is
common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised.63
Thus, because the validity of a state law was directly at issue, state
action was present. Alabama exercised its authority by establishing a
common law rule that permitted a state officer to recover for libel on a
showing of less than actual malice.' The fact that the Alabama
Supreme Court fashioned this common law rule-rather than the state
legislature via statute-did not affect the rule's status as the product of
state action.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See generallyKoMMERs, supra note 8, at 361-68 (translating the Lith case).
See id
Quint, supranote 23, at 262.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Id at 265 (citation omitted).
See id at 262-64.
Seeid at 265.
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The New York Times Co. Court did not purport to do anything
more than ascertain whether the Alabama common law of libel
satisfied the requirements of the Free Speech Clause; it did not purport
to apply general free speech principles to the merits of the litigation
itself. Had the law itself been consistent with the Free Speech Clause
(it was not), Alabama would have been free to apply it without any
further consideration of the First Amendment. The analysis in
Germany would be quite different.
Under the doctrine of secondary effect, the defendant in an action
for libel would remain free to argue that an award of damages would
violate the Basic Law, even if the statute that gives rise to the action is
itself unquestionably constitutional. The secondary effects doctrine
treats the application of civil law between private parties as state action
triggering the Basic Law. Accordingly, the Basic Law enjoys a far
more expansive scope of application than does the Bill of Rights or
Fourteenth Amendment. As Professor Eberle helpfully observes,
"from the standpoint of law in the 1990s, there is effectively no
difference in the standard of review applied by the Constitutional
'
Court to purely private or public law disputes."66
Moreover, challenges to the application of private law provisions
premised on the Basic Law are not limited to any particular provisions.
For example, a defendant in a libel action could invoke Article l's
dignity clause rather than Article 5's free speech clause if an argument
premised on the dignity guarantee would be plausible. This would be a
sound strategic move because the dignity clause guarantee generally
takes precedence over other constitutional rights.
In sum, "the German and American doctrines appear to reflect
fundamentally differing views about the nature of the distinction
between the public and the private realms."67 The Federal Constitutional
Court has, to a very large degree, collapsed the public/private
distinction when enforcing the provisions of the Basic Law.
Article 1 andthe CountervailingValue ofHuman Dignity
The Federal Constitutional Court has declared that the Basic Law
establishes "an objective ordering of values" with some rights being
more important than others." In this objective order of values,
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association are decidedly
C

66.
67.
68.

Eberle, supra note 58, at 813.
Quint, supm note 23, at 339.
See Eberle, supra note 58, at 811.
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inferior 69to the government's interest in securing and protecting human
dignity.

The primacy of dignity leads the German Constitutional Court to
reach results that appear odd to a student of the First Amendment. "In
part, this reflects the value-ordering function basic rights perform in
Germany, including communication rights."7
For example, the
German Constitutional Court has found that preserving the dignity of a
dead man outweighed the free expression rights of a living novelist
(who died before the final resolution of the case in the Federal
Constitutional Court); it has prohibited the publication of a fictional
interview involving the wife of the Shah of Iran;72 it has also enjoined
distribution of a docudrama about a gay robber" and refused to protect
political satire that presented a politician as a rutting pig.74 These cases
are discussed in greater detail below; together they demonstrate the
German Constitutional Court's firm decision to weigh dignity, which
encompasses the interest in personal reputation, above the freedom of
speech.
At the outset, one should note the full implications of these
holdings: speech routinely protected in the United States might well
be unprotected in Germany. For example, it is uncertain that the faux
Campari advertisement at issue in HustlerMagazine, Inc. v Falwell'
would enjoy constitutional protection under Article 5. The differences
go even deeper. Orson Welles's masterpiece, Citizen Kane, constitutes
69.
Eberle, supra note 24, at 971 (noting that "[h]uman dignity is the central value of
the Basic Law"); see also id. at 972 (noting that "dignity is the highest legal value in
Germany"). For a definition of the concept of "dignity" in German constitutional law
jurisprudence, see id.at 975-76.
70.
Eberle, supra note 58, at 805.
71.
Mephisto, BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971), translatedhm2 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 147, 180.
72.
Princess Soraya, BVerfGE 34, 269 (1973).
73.
Lebach, BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973), translatedinKoMMERs, supra note 8, at 416.
74.
Strau3 Caricature, BVerfGE 75, 369 (1987), translatedin 2 DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 420.
75.
485 U.S. 46,46-48 (1988). For a discussion and thoughtful critique of the Falwell
case, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:
DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 119-51 (1995). Post argues that "[t]he individualist methodology of first
amendment doctrine ultimately means that individuals must be free within public discourse
from the enforcement of all civility rules, so as to be able to advocate and to exemplify the
creation of new forms of communal life in their speech." Robert C. Post, The Constitutional

Concept of Public Discourse." Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,and Hustler
Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 647 (1990). The German approach generally
enforces civility norms against iconoclasts, precisely because maintaining a common culture
that safeguards personal honor constitutes a more pressing social objective for the German
legal system than facilitating transgressive self-expression. See infa notes 191-198 and
accompanying text.
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a thinly veiled commentary on William Randolph Hearst. Mr. Hearst
was very much alive at the time of its theatrical release (he worked
strenuously to block the film's distribution) and, given the Mephistd6
decision, his status among the living at the time the film premiered
probably would not matter anyway.
As Professor David Currie has aptly noted, "[e]xamination of the
German law of free expression reminds one once again how easily two
well-intentioned societies, starting from substantially identical
premises, can arrive at significantly different results."77 But Professor
Currie, at least to some extent, understates the glaring differences that
exist in the respective treatment of free speech:
Expression is a cardinal value both in Germany and in the United
States, both as an end in itself and as an indispensable tool of
democracy. In both countries it must yield on occasion to competing
values, and there is room for honest disagreement as to where to draw
the line.7"
In the United States, the freedom of speech is a "preferred"
freedom that generally outweighs other constitutional values, such as
community or equality. The federal courts disfavor government
regulation of speech based on content; the federal courts virtually
disallow any regulation of speech based on its viewpoint. Even in
areas of "unprotected" expression, such as hate speech conveying a
threat, the government may not adopt viewpoint-based regulations.79
None of these propositions holds true in Germany.8
With respect to the freedom of speech, the German approach
represents a fundamental and radical break with the marketplace of
ideas metaphor. Indeed, the ability of the government to suppress
speech far outstrips not only the Holmesian ideal of a "marketplace of
ideas,"81 but goes far beyond even Alexander Meiklejohn's town hall
BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971), translated in 2 DEcISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
1), supra note 23, at 147.
CURRIE, supra note 8, at 237.
77.
Id.
78.
79. See R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992).
80. See, e.g., Friedrich Kiibler, How Much Freedom for Racist Speech?"
TransnationalAspects of a Conflict of Human Rights, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 335, 340-47
(1998) (discussing German laws protecting reputation and prohibiting hate speech).
81. SeeAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that
the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out"); see also Gitlow v.
76.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt.
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metaphor.82 In Germany, "[s]peech is valued according to its utility in
promoting desirable [social] ends."83 This approach is largely, if not
completely, foreign to the post-Bmndenburg free speech tradition in

the United States.
Although Meiklejohn endorsed government regulations that
would promote a meaningful debate about the means and ends of
democratic self-government, he never suggested that the government's
power should extend to banning ideas or points of view that the
government thought to be socially harmful. ' Professor Stanley Fish is
undoubtedly correct to posit that speech is never free," but in Germany
the realm of "free speech" is significantly narrower than in the
contemporary United States. That said, whether this represents a better
adjustment of competing constitutional values is a question over which
reasonable minds may differ.86

New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672-73 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (invoking market metaphor).
Although Justice Holmes invoked the metaphor of a market for ideas, it was actually Justice
Brennan who coined the phrase "marketplace of ideas." See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381
U.S. 301, 308 (1965); see also OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH
AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER 160 n.25 (1996) (crediting Justice Brennan with
originating the phrase "marketplace of ideas").
82.

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS

OFTHE PEOPLE 26-27 (1960) (invoking town hall metaphor and suggesting goal of free speech
should not be that everyone be permitted to speak at will, but rather "that everything worth
saying shall be said") [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS]; see also
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 19-24

(1948) (setting forth a theory of free speech that includes government regulation to improve
the quality and depth of speech and suggesting that the primary function and purpose of free
speech is its ability to facilitate the process of democratic self-government) [hereinafter
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH].
83. Eberle, supm note 58, at 805.
84. See MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 82, at 19-24.
85.

See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD

THING, TOo 102-19 (1994).
86. See CURRIE, supra note 8, at 242-43. As Currie notes:
In all this there is much food for thought as to the proper role of a constitutional
court as well as the proper scope of free expression and of those cognate rights that
help to make it a reality. And that, in addition to the more modest but equally
worthy goal of better understanding, is what comparative law is all about.
Id.; see also Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for RacialInsults,Epithets,
andName-Calling,17 HAv.C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982) (arguing that an independent tort
action for racial insults is both permissible and necessary); Matsuda, supra note 1, at 2321
(calling for legal sanctions for racist speech); cf Steven G. Gey, The Case Against
Postmodem CensorshipTheory, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 193, 194-96 (1996) (arguing that efforts to
limit speech rights to advance other values constitutes impermissible government censorship).
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BALANCING DIGNITY AND FREE SPEECH

In a series of landmark opinions, the German Constitutional
Court has firmly embraced dignity as a preferred constitutional value
over the freedom of speech. Strangely enough, dignity claims even
survive the grave-a dead actor's dignity has greater constitutional
importance than a living author's interest in publishing his book.
A.

Mephisto: Bringingout the Dead

In the famous Mephstof7 case, the German Constitutional Court
considered whether an author's interest in free speech justified
burdening the dignity interests of a dead actor. The author, Klaus
Mann, published Mephisto, a novel about an actor who collaborates
with the Nazi government during the 1930s and 1940s. " The fictional
actor, Hendrik Hfgen, was loosely based on Mann's brother-in-law,
the German actor Gustaf Griindgens. "The novel describes the rise of
the highly gifted actor Hendrik H6fgen, who disowns his political
conviction and strips off all human and ethical ties in order to make an
artistic career in a pact with the masters of Nationalist Socialist
Germany."9 In another work, The TurningPoin4 Klaus Mann publicly
identified Griindgens as the model for the fictional actor Hendrik
Hdfgen °
Griindgens's adopted son initiated a lawsuit in state court to block
the distribution of the novel because it dishonored his dead father's
memory." The trial court dismissed the action, but the Regional
Appellate Court reversed. 2 It found that "[t]he novel injured
Griindgens in his honour, his reputation and his social position, and
grossly defamed his memory."93 Accordingly, the author "could not
appeal to Article 5(3) GG" because his novel "constituted insult,
87.

BVerfGE 30,

173 (1971),

translated in 2

DECISIONS

OF THE

FEDERAL

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 147; see also KOMMERS, supra note 8, at

301-04.
88.

Mephisto, BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971), ftanslatedin 2 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
1), supra note 23, at 147, 148.
89. Id.
90. KLAUS MANN, THE TURNING POINT 281-82 (1942). The Federal Constitutional
Court cites this work and quotes Mann's identification of the fictional character with
Griindgens. Mephisto, BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971), translatedin 2 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 148-49.
91.
Mephisto, BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971), translatedin 2 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 149.
92. See id. at 149-50.
93.
Id.
at 150.
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt.
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disparagement and defamation of Griindgens."9'
The Regional
Appellate Court concluded that the deceased Griindgens's Article 1
dignity interest and Article 2 personality right, at least on the facts
presented, outweighed Mann's Article 5(3) right to free expression and,
accordingly, prohibited distribution of the book in Germany.95 The
Federal High Court of Justice affirmed this decision.96 Thereafter, the
publisher sought review of the decision in the Federal Constitutional
Court, on the basis that the injunction violated Article 5(1) and 5(3) of
the Basic Law.97
The Federal Constitutional Court began its analysis of the case by
framing the dispute as involving a conflict of constitutional claims:
Mann's publisher and estate claimed rights protected by Article 5(1)
and 5(3), while Griindgens's son and estate asserted rights protected
under Article 1 and 2.98 The Justices found that Mann's novel
constituted "art" for purposes of applying Article 5(3) and that the
distribution of art enjoyed constitutional protection: "Article 5(3) ...
guarantees freedom of operation in the artistic sphere
comprehensively. Accordingly, where, to create the relationships
between artist and public, means of publication are needed, persons
engaged in such mediatory activity are also protected by the guarantee
of artistic freedom."99
Moreover, the Basic Law protects artistic freedom "without
'
reservations .""
This conclusion did not answer the ultimate question,
however, because Article 5 claims are subordinate to claims arising
under the dignity clause in Article 1. The court explained that "the
dignity of man guaranteed in Article " may take precedence over an
otherwise valid Article 5 claim because dignity is "the supreme value
01
[that] dominates the whole value system of the fundamental rights'
Resolving the conflict required "weighing up all the circumstances of
the individual case.""' 2
After examining the facts found by the lower courts, notably
including the fact that "Griindgens concerned a person of
94.
Id
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
at 151.
97.
See id
98.
See id at 153. Ironically, Mann died prior to the Federal Constitutional Court's
decision in the case. The Mephisto case therefore tested a dead author's interest in free
expression against another dead man's reputational rights.
99.
Id.
at 155.
100. Id.
101. Id.at 156.
102. Id at 158.
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contemporary history and that public memory of him is still alive,
"
the Federal Constitutional Court found that the balance favored
vindication of Grfindgens's Article 1 right over Mann's Article 5(3)
interest in freedom of artistic expression.'" In so holding, it rejected
the proposition that "the publication ban was out of proportion to the
expected curtailment of the right to respect of the late Gustaf
Griindgens'1 5 Accordingly, the Justices sustained the publication ban,
noting that "[t]he considerations underlying this ban are not
inappropriate to the case."'0 6 As Professor Quint has explained, "[i]t
was this countervailing constitutional guarantee of personality,
therefore, that could have the effect of limiting artistic expression."' 7
The result was far from unanimous. Three Justices dissented,
arguing that the majority failed to examine adequately the balancing of
interests undertaken by the lower courts.' Justice Stein argued:
If in cases like the present one ... the Federal Constitutional Court's
reviewing power were to be confined to a narrowly limited check,
namely whether the courts had at all seen the application of the
fundamental rights, taken it into account and not contravened the
general prohibition on arbitrariness then the Federal Constitutional
Court would not be properly doing its job of being a guardian of the
fundamental rights in all areas of law.0 9
The dissenters suggested that the lower courts had emphasized the
interest in social reputation too much, and valued the social good of
artistic expression too little, in finding for Griindgens."' "A free art
must in principle be allowed to take off from personal information
from reality and give it generalized significance through symbolic
value.""' This is especially true, the dissenters argued, when a public
official or public figure serves as the artistic inspiration."2 It
necessarily follows that "[t]he guarantee of artistic freedom in
10 3

103. Id
104. Id.
at 158-59.
105. Seeid at 160.
106. Id at 161. Because Article 5(3) provides a more specific textual home for
Mann's claim, the Federal Constitutional Court declined to apply Article 5(1). See id.
("Artistic statements, even if they contain statements of opinion, mean something other than
those statements.").
107. Quint, supra note 23, at 295.
108. See Mephisto, BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971), translated in 2 DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 162-63 (Stein, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
(Stein, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
110. See id at 163-64 (Stein, J., dissenting).
11. Id.at 166 (Stein, J., dissenting).
112. See id (Stein, J., dissenting).
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principle allows neither the restriction of the range of artistic topics nor
the exclusion of means and methods of expression from the process of
artistic transformation."" 3
The dissent also argued that the novel did not infringe Gustaf
Griindgens's Article 1 dignity rights."' The subject was already
deceased, his public reputation was largely committed to history rather
than current events, and the book was plainly a work of fiction and
featured a foreword stating this directly."5 "For these reasons, no grave
detriment to the personality sphere of the late Gustaf Grdindgens can
be found" and "[c]onsequently, there is no clear infringement of
Article 1(l)[.] " 6

A second dissent, by Justice Rupp-von Briinneck, emphasized
that the Federal Constitutional Court had an obligation to engage in a
de novo balancing of the relevant interests: "The dismissal of the
constitutional complaint is based on a restrictive interpretation of the
Federal Constitutional Court's competence for review, which marks a
break with existing case law and can lead to very dubious
consequences.""'7 Absent stronger evidence of an intent by Mann to
defame Griindgens, the Basic Law's protection of artistic freedom
should prevail." 8 The dissent also invoked the case law of the United
States Supreme Court, noting that the Court "in regard to persons and
objects of contemporary affairs in principle always rates the general
interest in free public debate above the personal interests that may be
affected by false information or polemic description, as long as no
'actual malice' is present."'19 On the facts presented, Mann's novel
plainly implicated a higher constitutional value than Graindgens's postmortem dignity interest.'2°
B. Princess Soraya: Telling Tales out ofSchool
Two years later, in Puncess Soray the Federal Constitutional
Court sustained an award of damages based on the publication of a
fictional interview with the ex-wife of the then-Shah of Iran.'' The
periodical Die Welt published the story, which discussed "intimate
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
at 167 (Stein, J., dissenting).
See id at 171-72 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Seeid at 171-73 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Id.
at 173 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Id.
at 175 (Rupp-von Briinneck, J., dissenting).
See id. at 179-80 (Rupp-von Briinneck, J., dissenting).
Id.
at 179 (Rupp-von Briinneck, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See id at 180 (Rupp-von Briinneck, J., dissenting).
SeeBVerfGE 34, 269 (1973).
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details of her private life"'' 22 Soraya commenced a civil suit seeking
money damages."3 On review from the Federal High Court of Justice,
the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide whether Article 5
provided a defense against the action for damages."'
The Federal Constitutional Court held in favor of Soraya and
rejected Die Welts Article 5 defense, explaining that "[a]n imaginary
interview adds nothing to the formation of real public opinion.""' The
Basic Law's protection of dignity, which encompasses personal
reputation, required that "[t]he degree of care that must be expended to
avoid dissemination of an nag~ary interview... is never too much to
expect. "' Accordingly, in such circumstances, "[a]s against press
of this sort, the protection of privacy takes unconditional
utterances
'' 7
priority. 2
In justifying this outcome, the Justices explained that "[t]he
personality and dignity of an individual, to be freely enjoyed and
developed within a societal and communal framework, stand at the
very center of the value order reflected in the fundamental rights
protected by the Constitution.' '2 8 Thus, "all organs of the state" have a
responsibility to protect "an individual's interest in his personality and
dignity."" 9 Whatever free speech value the faux interview possessed
paled in comparison, at least in the Federal Constitutional Court's view,
to Soraya's interest in avoiding the false presentation about her private
life."'
C. Lebach: Tuth Is No Defense
In the same year that it decided Princess Soray the Federal
Constitutional Court also held that interests protected under the dignity
clause outweighed any free speech value in a television movie
presenting the true story of a gay robber."' Lebach, the gay robber,
122.

KOMMERS, supm note 8, at 124.

123.

Seeid

124. Seeid at 128.

125. CURRIE, supra note 8,at 198 (translating Pnncess Soraya, BVerfGE 34, 283-84
(1973)).

126. Id.at 198 n.95 (internal quotations omitted) (translating Princess Somya,
BVerfGE 34, 286 (1973)).

127.
128.
(1973)).
129.

Id.
at 198 (translating PincessSoraya,BVerfGE 34,283-84 (1973)).
KoMMERS, supranote 8, at 419-20 (translating Princess Soraya,BVerfGE 34, 269
Id.at 420 (translating PrincessSoraya BVerfGE 34, 269 (1973)).

130. See id
131. Lebach,BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973), translatedin KOMMERS, supra note 8,at 418-
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had already completed his prison term at the time the movie was to be
televised.'32 As Professor Currie notes, "the Court held the constitution
requireda remedy-this time to protect the right to free development
of personality guaranteed by Art[icle] 2(1) in conjunction with the
right to human dignity, which under Art[icle] 1(1) the state has an
explicit affirmative obligation to protect."' 33 As in the Mephisto case,
the plaintiff sought and obtained injunctive relief against the
distribution of the film-essentially, a very strong form of prior
restraint.'34

The Federal Constitutional Court explained that the case
presented a conflict of values that required the court to "balance" or
"adjust" the conflicting constitutional rights:
In case of conflict [the court] must adjust both constitutional values, if
possible; if this cannot be achieved, [the court] must determine which
interest will defer to the other in the light of the nature of the case and
[its] special circumstances. In so doing, [the court] must consider both
constitutional values in their relation
to human dignity as the nucleus of
35
the Constitution's value system.
The justices went on to conclude that the media have a justifiable
interest in reporting crimes when they occur, as part of the natural
news cycle, but that this interest in reporting on such matters declines
rather quickly with time.'36 Thus, "[t]he radiating effect of the
constitutional guarantee of the right of personality does not, however,
permit the media, over and above reporting on contemporary events, to
intrude indefinitely upon the person and private sphere of the
'
137
criminal.'

In the case of a convicted defendant who has completed his
prison sentence and been released, the news value does not outweigh
the felon's interest in dignity and free development of his personality.
"Once a criminal court has prosecuted and convicted a defendant for
an act that has attracted public attention, and he has experienced the
just reaction of the community, any further or repeated invasion of the
criminal's personal sphere cannot normally be justified "''38 A
television station may not re-broadcast a story about a past crime if
132. Seeidat416.
133. CuRRiE, supm note 8, at 199 n.96.
134. Seeid at 199.
135. Lebach, BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973), ftanslatedinKMMERS, supranote 8, at 417.
136. Seeid at418.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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doing so "endangers the social rehabilitation of the criminal."'39 This is
so because "[t]he criminal's vital interest in being reintegrated into
society and the interest of the community in restoring him to his social
position must generally have precedence over the public's interest in
further discussion of the crime."' ° The Constitutional Court reversed
the lower appellate court with instructions that the television network
should be enjoined from broadcasting the program about Lebach.''
The result in Lebach provides virtually no protection to truthful
speech about a matter of public concern in order to advance concerns
rooted in the dignity and personality clauses. Thus, "the limiting effect
of the constitutional right of personality on expression can be
substantial "''42 Lebach, unlike Soraya, made no claim that the speech
about him was factually false-he merely asserted that it violated his
dignity and personality rights and would impede his reintegration into
society."'
Professor Eberle describes these cases as creating a right to
"informational self-determination" which "endows individuals with
the right to control the portrayal of the facts and details of their
lives.'"" This right encompasses the ability "to shield hurtful truths
from public scrutiny in order to safeguard reputation or other
personality interests" as well as "protection of personal honor as an
outgrowth of personality."1 '5 The protection of these interests "can be
extended to eclipse other basic rights," notably including "Article 5
expression guarantees."'4 6
Thus, Article 1, as construed in Lebach, displaces truthful speech
about an undoubted matter of public concern. This is a very
substantial incursion on the freedom of speech (at least to an American
constitutional lawyer's eyes) and demonstrates the decidedly inferior
position that free speech occupies in the Federal Constitutional Court's
objective order of constitutional values." '

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
416-19.
144.
145.

Id. at 419.
Id.
Seeidat418-19.
Quint, supranote 23, at 301.
See Lebach, BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973), translatedin KOMMERS, supra note 8, at
Eberle, supra note 24, at 1009.
Id.

146. Id.
147. See Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudenceof Free Speech in the United States
andthe FederalRepublicof Germany,53 S. CAL. L. REv. 657, 691-93 (1980).
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B611: ProtectingPublicFigures

Some might argue that the Constitutional Court's decisions in the
early 1970s reflect a concern for reputation that no longer holds true.
Professor Currie posits that "[t]he overall trend... has been toward
greater protection of speech, especially in matters of public concern." '48
He suggests that "[d]espite earlier decisions that appeared to embrace a
more restrictive philosophy, it thus seems fair to say that, while the
Constitutional Court continues to give the constitutionally protected
interest in personal honor more weight than do analogous decisions of
the Supreme Court, the gap has narrowed considerably."'49 This
optimism toward greater protection for the freedom of speech seems
somewhat overstated.
It may well be true that "[i]n most cases the German court seems
inclined today to afford political and artistic expression a degree of
protection comparable to that afforded by the [United States] Supreme
Court."5 ' But the Federal Constitutional Court has upheld free speech
claims only when the personal insult was not targeted at any particular
individual.
In cases involving targeted insults, the Federal
Constitutional Court has continued down the path outlined in
Mephisto, PrincessSoraya, and Lebach.
In 1980, for example, the German Constitutional Court rejected a
free press claim in favor of protecting the dignity and reputation of a
public figure.'"' In B6l, the Federal Constitutional Court had to decide
whether the freedom of the press extended to false statements
attributed to Heinrich B611, a famous writer.'52 A local television
station ran a commentary that attributed certain statements to B611specifically, the newscaster said that B611 had called the contemporary
German state a "dungheap," featuring "residues of rotting power,
defended with ratlike rage."'53 Finally, B611 was quoted as criticizing
the government for pursuing the terrorists who killed the presiding
judge of the Berlin Court of Appeal "in a merciless hunt."'' " The
Federal High Court of Justice reversed a favorable lower court decision
because "[t]he criticism ... both in content and form and in means
148.

CURRIE, supa note 8, at 206.

149. Id.
150. Id
151.

SeeKOMMERS, supra note 8, at 420-21.

152.
153.

Seeid
See B611, BVerfGE 54, 208 (1980), ttanslatedin 2

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1),

154.

Id.

supa note 23, at 190.

DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
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employed, [was] within the sphere of freedom guaranteed to
expression of one's own opinion in a television commentary by Article
5(1) Basic Law. '55
The German Constitutional Court reversed the Federal High
Court of Justice, ruling that the commentary featured false quotes and
that these quotes damaged B611's dignity and personality rights,
guaranteed by Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law. "The attacks directed
against the complainant in the commentary were of such a nature as to
infringe the complainant's constitutionally guaranteed general
personality right."' 56 The Constitutional Court flatly ruled that
"[m]isquotations are not protected by Article 5(1)" and opined that
"[i]t cannot be seen that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
opinion requires such protection.""5 7 Not only had the lower court
overstated the media's Article 5 rights, but it also had seriously
undervalued the plaintiff's Article 1 and 2 rights to the protection of his
dignity and personality.'
Professor Quint has noted that "the B&l case ...affirms a
requirement of vigorous judicial review under some circumstances in
order to vindicate the right of personality against the countervailing
interests in speech."'59 In other words, appellate courts reviewing a
decision in favor of the free speech claim have an obligation to
scrutinize closely the facts to ensure that the defendant did not escape
liability for causing harm to the dignity interests of the plaintiff. In the
United States, by way of contrast, searching review of trial results also
applies in defamation cases involving public figures, public officials,
or matters of public concern-but this searching review applies only
when the plaintiff prevails.'60 Thus, in the United States, the
presumption runs in precisely the opposite direction: a verdict
imposing liability on a press entity receives careful appellate review,
including independent review of all matters of constitutional fact.

at 191.
155. Id.
156. Id.at 194-95.
at 196.
157. Id.
158. Seeid at 197-98.
159. Quint, supm note 23, at 337.
160. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984)
(requiring independent appellate review of questions of constitutional fact resolved adversely
to media defendant); see also S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,
Recaiibmting the Cost ofHarm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1159, 1236 (2000) ("Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that the First
Amendment entitles a speaker to an independent examination of a court or jury determination
that the speech is subject to regulation.").
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StrauB Caricature: ProtectingPoliticiansfrom HarshParody

Other, even more recent, cases also seem to contradict Professor
62 the
Currie's suggestion.6 ' For example, in StrauI3 Caticaturd
Constitutional Court had to decide whether a particularly harsh
political cartoon merited protection under Article 5 of the Basic Law
or, instead, whether the cartoon went "too far" and therefore
constituted a violation of Article 1's guarantee of personal dignity.'63 A
magazine called Konkret published a series of disparaging cartoons
featuring Bavarian Prime Minister Franz Josef Strau3 as a pig.6 The
Constitutional Court explained:
In the first of these drawings the pig is copulating with a pig dressed in
judicial costume. A further caricature shows both figures of pigspartly in pairs, partly separately--engaged in a variety of sexual
activity. A third drawing shows four pigs, three of them mounting the
pig in front. Here too, two of the figures of pigs bear the facial features
of the Bavarian Minister-President and two are dressed in judicial robes
and toque. The caption to the first drawing is: 'Satire may do
anything': can Rainer Hachfeld too?" The second drawing has the
caption: "Which drawing is the right one, finally, Mr. Prosecutor?"
The third caricature was preceded by a cut version of a letter from the
complainant to the editors of "konkret", complaining that he kept on
having to draw more pictures of little pigs because the Bavarian
Minister-President would not give him any rest.'65
Needless to say, being portrayed as a rutting pig did not sit well
with Prime Minister StrauB. He initiated an action for defamation
against Konkrez seeking money damages.'66 The local trial court
found for StrauB, but the Regional Court reversed.'67 At the next level
of appeals, however, StrauB prevailed.'68 The Regional Appellate Court
reinstated the local court's verdict, finding that the presentation of
StrauB as a swine went beyond the limits of fair comment. 9

161. In fairness to Professor Currie, he acknowledges these cases, even as he asserts
that the Constitutional Court has afforded "greater protection" to the freedom of speech. See
CURRIE, supm note 8, at 206.
162. StrauB Caricature, BVerfGE 75, 369 (1987), tanslated in 2 DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CoNsTrUTIoNAL CouRT (pt. 2), supranote 23, at 420, 420-21.

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Seeid at421-22.
See id.
at 420.
Id. at 420-21.
Id
Id. at 421.
See id
See id
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The Federal Constitutional Court easily found that "[t]he
caricatures at issue are the formed outcome of free creative action" and
therefore "meet the requirements" for protection under Article 5(3).17
The Court went on to find that the Regional Appellate Court had
properly balanced the magazine's interest in artistic freedom (and
political commentary) against Strauss's interest in personal honor and
dignity.71 It explained that "[t]he necessary balancing of conflicting
constitutionally protected interests necessary because of the tension
between artistic freedom and the general right to personality of third
inevitably in the present case to lead to the result it
parties had
72
found.

Although satire and parody enjoy protection under Articles 5(l)
and 5(3), this protection must give way to the paramount importance
of personal dignity.'73 On the facts presented, Konkret had gone
beyond "usual portrayals" such as "characterizing or exaggerating
particular traits or the physiognomy of a person by choosing the form
of an animal."'7 4 Instead, "what was plainly intended was an attack on
'
the personal dignity of the person caricatured.' 75
The Court took some pains to explain that
[i]t [was] not his human features, his personal peculiarities, that are to
be brought home to the observer through the alienation chosen. Instead,
the intention is to show that he has marked "bestial" characteristics and
behaves accordingly. Particularly the portrayal of sexual conduct,
which in man still today forms part of the core of intimate life
deserving of protection, is intended to devalue the person concerned as
a person, to deprive him of his dignity as a human being. The
complainant is thereby condemning him in a way that a legal system
76
that takes the dignity of man as the highest value must disapprove of

Utterly absent from the Constitutional Court's analysis is any
discounting of the politician's interest in dignity as an essential
accommodation to the democratic process.'77 Under the Basic Law, a

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.at 423.
Seeid at424-25.
Id.at 425.
See idat 425-26.
Id.at 425.
Id.
Id.
Seeid at 420-27.
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politician enjoys the same claim to personal honor and dignity as a
private citizen.'78
Of course, there is nothing fundamentally inconsistent with
maintaining both a commitment to democratic self-governance and, at
the same time, a strong commitment to protecting personal dignity.
But history teaches that thin-skinned politicians are often willing to
use the power of the state to suppress dissent. This is certainly true of
Germany's history. What reason is there to think that politicians
empowered with the credible threat of prosecution would not use this
power to silence, or at least chill, dissent?
E

Digmiiyas the 'Preferred"Freedom

At one time, it was commonplace in the United States to see the
First Amendment, and particularly the Free Speech Clause, referred to
as a "preferred freedom" or in a "preferred position."'79 Under the
preferred position doctrine, First Amendment freedoms should be
given priority over other guarantees in the Bill of Rights and the
federal judiciary should exercise a special vigilance when government
encroaches on the exercise of these rights. 8° In the mid-twentieth
century, the Supreme Court explained the doctrine as follows:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this
Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power
begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more
so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by
the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. That priority
178. See id; cf Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (noting the
American prerogative to criticize public officials); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-82 (1964) (recognizing the special need for criticism of public officials).
179. See, e.g.,
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) ("Courts must balance the
various community interests in passing on the constitutionality of local regulations of the
character involved here. But in that process they should be mindful to keep the freedoms of
the First Amendment in a preferred position."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164
(1944) ("If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a broader protection
than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted that any of the great liberties insured by the
First Article can be given higher place than the others. All have preferred position in our
basic scheme."); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) ("Freedom of press,
freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position.").
180. See Edmond Cahn, The Firsess of the First Amendmen4 65 YALE L.J. 464
(1956); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (arguing
that "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth").
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gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions. And it is the character of the right, not of the limitation,
which determines what standard governs the choice.'
By the late 1950s, the Supreme Court's invocation of the
"preferred position" of the First Amendment had declined in favor of
more open-ended balancing tests.' 2 Even so, the Supreme Court's
vindication of speech claims against important countervailing interests
(such as reputation) continues to reflect the First Amendment's de
facto "preferred position" in constitutional adjudication.
Although not every plaintiff with a free speech claim prevails, the
federal courts are remarkably solicitous of such claims, even when the
speech at issue does not implicate core concerns of the First
Amendment.183 Indeed, it would be no overstatement to say that free
speech stands in more or less the same position in the United States
constitutional scheme as does dignity under the German Basic Law.
What we find, then, is an inversion of values. The United States
Supreme Court routinely subordinates values associated with personal
dignity, honor, and reputation in favor of vindicating free speech
claims. Cases like Hustler Magazine, Inc. v Falwel" simply do not
have any German counterparts. Nor is this an accident. Simply put,
the German constitutional scheme elevates dignity as the "preferred
freedom" and does so quite overtly at the expense of the freedom of
speech.
If one views this state of affairs critically (as one well might), the
question arises as to where the blame should lie. To be clear, one
should hesitate before placing principal responsibility on the Federal
181. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (citations omitted); seeMarsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) ("When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners
of property against those of the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must
here, we remain mindful of the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.").
182. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-85 (1957) (rejecting a First
Amendment defense to prosecution for obscenity, and holding that hardcore erotica does not
implicate the Free Speech Clause at all). But cf id.at 514 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the materials should enjoy constitutional protection because "[t]he First Amendment puts
free speech in the preferred position"); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 895 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The compelling interest test effectuates the
First Amendment's command that religious liberty is an independent liberty, that it occupies a
preferred position, and that the Court will not permit encroachments upon this liberty,
whether direct or indirect, unless required by clear and compelling government interests of
the highest order." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
183. See Lillian R. BeVier, Intersection and Divergence: Some Reflections on the
Warren Court, Civil Rights, and the FirstAmendmen4 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1075, 108486, 1091-93 (2002).
184. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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Constitutional Court. After all, the Basic Law itselfstrictly limits the
protection of free speech by conditioning the scope of this freedom on
other interests, notably including "the right to respect for personal
honor."' Thus, the Basic Law itself elevates personal honor as a
coequal interest with the freedom of speech-and does so entirely
independently of the effect of Article 1.
When one then turns to Article 1, one finds that the very first
86
right the Basic Law articulates is the protection of human dignity.
By way of contrast, the Bill of Rights makes the freedom of speech,
press, and assembly (along with the religion clauses) its first
concern. 8 7 The structural contrast could not be more striking. Article
79(3) further confirms this textual primacy by rendering Article 1
unamendable; it is a permanent and fixed part of the German
constitutional order.' No comparable protection exists for Article 5.
Finally, Article 2 lends further support to the primacy of dignity by
protecting a citizen's interest in "the free development of his
personality.""'8 The Federal Constitutional Court has found that this
provision has a synergistic effect with Article 1 that enhances the
relative weight of dignity claims in certain contexts (such as those
presented in Lebach)9
Thus, the Basic Law itself goes a very long way toward placing
free speech in a decidedly inferior position to dignity interests in
general, and reputational interests in particular. But it would be a
mistake simply to rest the explanation on a simplistic textualist
argument. Clever judges are quite capable of evading textual mandates
that they do not like. It would grossly underestimate the Justices of the
Constitutional Court to suggest that text alone explains their
comparatively weak commitment to the freedom of speech.
As Professor Whitman has observed, "[t]here is, when you add all
this up, a very great difference indeed between the American and
Continental European legal traditions."1 ' But more importantly, there
are significant culturaldifferences at work too. A culture of honor, or
respect, has been an important feature of German social life for quite a
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
416-17.
191.
L.J. 1279,

GG art. 5(2) (ER.G.).
Seeid art. 1(1).
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
GG art. 79(3).
Id.art. 2(1).
See Lebach, BVerfGE 35, 202 (1973), tanslated in KOMMERS, supra note 8, at
James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect.: Three Sociees, 109 YALE
1381 (2000).
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long time. Although the roots of this tradition are aristocratic, the
expectation of respect has been effectively and thoroughly
democratized.'92 Professor Whitman traces the broadest extension of
personal insult law to the Nazi period.'93 He notes that "[t]his
'nationalization' of honor nicely paralleled a 'nationalization' of honor
that took place during the French Revolution, and it had some of the
same revolutionary implications: At least potentially, every German
was a person of honor."' 94
Whitman suggests that, in the United States, "honor is truly
absent from our legal thought-world."' 9 But this absence in our legal
thought-world is a product of our broader culture. In the United States,
we really do not worry very much about securing to every person a
"minimum of honor," something that Whitman characterizes as
"deeply rooted in [German and French] cultural tradition."'9 6 Germany
and the United States "have followed divergent paths of development
in their march toward social egalitarianism as we see it today:
Germany and France have leveled up, the United States has leveled
down."'97 Whitman goes so far as to posit that "it is not wrong, in
contrasting them with the United States, to describe Germany and
France as modem honor cultures."' 98
Professor Whitman also has observed that the German laws
protecting personal honor and dignity constitute "a body of law that
shows, in many of its doctrines, a numbness to free-speech concerns
that will startle any American."'9'9 This characterization seems spot on:
German law's disregard of the chilling effects of the civil and criminal
law's protection of personal honor is utterly antithetical to the free
speech project embodied by the First Amendment. That politicians
could enjoy not merely statutory, but, in fact, an absolute and
unamendable constitutional privilege to be free from sharp or caustic
criticism, represents a complete departure from baseline assumptions
about the freedom of speech as it has been conceptualized in the
United States.
Returning to Professor Currie's suggestion that "[t]he overall
trend, nevertheless, has been toward greater protection of speech,
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Seeid.at1295-1300, 1313-30.
Seeid.at 1296.
Id.at 1328-29 (footnote omitted).
Id.at 1382.
Id at 1384.
Id.at 1387.
Id.at 1391.
Id.at 1312.
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especially in matters of public concern,"" one can make the case that
the Federal Constitutional Court has protected speech when the
countervailing dignity interest was diffuse.
For example, the
Constitutional Court has held that Article 5 protects art that allegedly
casts contempt upon the German national flag"0 1 and a harsh parody of
the German national anthem.02 Thus, when the dignity of the state is
itself at issue, the German Constitutional Court has vindicated free
speech claims. The same result obtained in Tucholsky, which involved
a legal challenge to the use of the phrase "soldiers are murderers." 3
Because the statement was not directed at any particular solider, no
significant dignity interest existed."° Only in the context of antiSemitic speech has the contemporary German Constitutional Court
protected dignity at the expense of free speech in near absolute terms.
Thus, Professor Currie's assertion withstands scrutiny, at least
when judged against the dignity of the German government itself or
against abstract interests (although remarks of an anti-Semitic cast
constitute a notable exception to this general approach). As the
German Constitutional Court has explained, "the norm [the protection
of personal honour] cannot be justified from the viewpoint of personal
200. See CURRIE, supranote 8, at 206.
201. See Flag Desecration, BVerfGE 81, 278 (1990), tanslatedin2 DECISIONS OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 437. One should note that the
Constitutional Court invalidated criminal convictions for flag desecration only on an "as
applied basis." The Court explained that although "complainants' actions fall in the area of
artistic freedom protection" that this conclusion "does not, from the outset, actually stand in
the way of punishment under § 90a ... of the Criminal Code ... for disparaging the federal
flag." Id. at 443.
202. See German National Anthem, BVerfGE 81, 298 (1990), translated in 2
DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 450. In this
case, the magazine Howlerpublished a parody of the German national anthem. See id at 451
(providing the text of the parody). A local court convicted the publisher of an offense under
section 90a(l) of the German Criminal Code and the appellate courts affirmed the
conviction. See id. at 452. The Federal Constitutional Court reversed on Article 5(3)
grounds, finding that the lower courts had failed properly to balance the publisher's interest in
using the national anthem to parody social contradictions against the government's interest in
preserving the dignity of the national anthem. See id. at 455-57. Here, the value of the satire
outweighed, at least in context, the state interest in protecting the national anthem. As in the
Flag Desecration case, the Constitutional Court invalidated the convictions only on an "as
applied" basis.
203. See Tucholsky (Soldiers are Murderers), BVerfGE 93, 266 (1995), translatedin 2
DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 659. The
Federal Constitutional Court held that Article 5(1) protected a citizen who published the
words "Soldiers Are Murderers," provided that the statement is not directed at any particular
soldier or group of soldiers. See id at 676-77. "Instead, they expressed a judgement about
soldiers and about the profession of soldier, which in some circumstances compels the killing
of other people." Id at 677.
204. Seeid. at 676-77.
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honour, since State institutions neither have 'personal' honour nor are
bearers of the general right of personality. 2 5 It is true that "[w]ithout a
minimum of social acceptance, State institutions cannot carry out their
functions" and "may therefore in principle be protected against verbal
attacks that threaten to undermine these requirements

2 6

But the

protection of state agencies and institutions via the criminal law "may
not however have the effect of protecting State institutions against
public criticism, possibly even in sharp forms, something intended to
guaranteed by the fundamental right of freedom of
be especially
"2 7
opinion.

0

When the dignity interest involves a specific individual, however,
the Federal Constitutional Court usually finds that reputation (even of
a dead person) trumps the Article 5 interest in freedom of expression.
As the Court put the matter in the Tucholsky, "freedom of opinion
must always take second place where the statement affects another's
human dignity."2 8 As late as 1995, the Court emphasized that "human
dignity as the root of all fundamental rights cannot be weighed against
any individual fundamental right"--including those rights protected
under Article 5.209 The Constitutional Court made very clear that, had
the Tucholsky defendants plainly called specific soldiers "murderers,"
a different result would obtain. °
This analysis of the phrase, "soldiers are murderers" or "soldiers
are potential murderers," drew a sharp dissent from Justice Haas, who
believed that the lower courts had properly applied the civil code
provision protecting personal honor.' She observed that "[r]efraining
from personal defamation in the political opinion-forming process can
only promote that process, by raising the culture of political conflict.' ' 2
She further argued that the majority's failure to protect the honor of
German soldiers as a class or group risked the Basic Law's popular
legitimacy: "It is a simple matter of course that the constitution must
not, if it is not to lose its credibility, leave unprotected those who
follow 21 its
commands and are attacked (exclusively) for that very
3
thing."
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

at 678.
Id.
Id.
(citation omitted).
Id (citation omitted).
Id.
at 680.
Id
Seeid.at 682-88.
See id at 694-98 (Haas, J., dissenting).
Id.at 698 (Haas, J., dissenting).
Id.(Haas, J., dissenting).
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Thus, Tucholsky makes clear that the protection for free speech
critical of the government runs to critiques of government institutions
and offices, and not to the individuals who staff them."' The rule set
forth in cases like Lebach Princess Somya, and Straufi Carcature
remains in place. Free speech enjoys protection only to the extent that
it does not displace the Basic Law's principal concern: the protection
of personal dignity and honor.
III. BALANCING FREE SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY

In another important series of cases, the German Constitutional
Court has vigorously enforced the Basic Law's mandate to safeguard
democratic processes and institutions. Germany is a "militant
' and the freedom of speech does not extend to advocacy
democracy,"215
of the abolition of the existing constitutional order."6
The Federal Constitutional Court certainly acknowledges and
embraces the relationship of free speech to democratic selfgovernment:
As the most immediate manifestation of the human personality in
society, the basic right to free expression of opinion is one of the noblest
of all human rights.... To a free democratic constitutional order it is
absolutely basic for it alone makes possible the continuing intellectual
controversy, the contest of opinions that forms the lifeblood of such an
order. In a certain sense it is the basis of all freedom whatever, "the
matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
'
freedom."217
Professor Currie notes that "[i]n light of this focus on the central role
of free expression in the functioning of democracy, it is understandable
that the German court, like its counterpart in the United States, has
emphasized that political speech lies at the heart of the constitutional
provisions."2 '8 Accordingly, no commercial speech doctrine exists in
Germany; the Federal Constitutional Court has sustained both
legislation limiting advertising by pharmacies and banning advertising

214. Seeid.at862-88.
215. SeeEberle, supm note 58, at 825.
216. Seeid.at 825-26.
217. Liith, BVerfGE 7, 198, 208 (1958) (author's translation) (quoting Justice
Cardozo); see also 2 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, supra note 23, at 1,
7 (providing an alternate translation of the Lflth opinion).
218. CURRIE,supra note 8, at 175.
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by physicians on the theory that commercial advertising does not
implicate Article 5 values in a meaningful Way.29
In practical terms, this means that even if speech does not offend
the dignity clause (Article I), it may still not enjoy substantial
protection from either government or private abridgement if the speech
is of the wrong sort. And what, precisely, is speech of the wrong sort?
Speech that has as its object the overthrow of the existing
constitutional order is most definitely speech of the wrong sort.22 1 So
too is anti-Semitic speech." ' As Professor Whitman has observed, "[i]t
is indeed the case that Jews are extensively shielded from
'disrespectful' insults under current German law."2 Moreover, "[t]he
German commitment to protecting Jewish sensibilities is in this regard
'
remarkably far-reaching."223
But to be clear: the proscription of speech by the German
government is most assuredly one-sided and viewpoint based. Thus,
one can inveigh at will against Nazis, Communists, or anti-Semites.
Speech hostile to these positions is not only protected under Article 5,
but also seems to be entirely consistent with the rather limited dignity
interests of Nazis, Communists, and anti-Semites.
Or, stated
somewhat more directly, the Federal Constitutional Court appears to be
generally more protective of speech that advances the favored
government position on these issues than it is of other kinds of speech.
Moreover, the legal proscriptions against hate speech are, in
practice, not universal in their application: "It is important to
recognize, though, that the broaderGerman commitment to respectful
treatment is somewhat less far-reaching."2' ' Thus, while the German
government is committed to protecting Jewish citizens and visitors
from the psychological harms associated with hate speech, it is not as
vigilant with respect to other groups, such as persons of Turkish
ancestry."' As the cases discussed below will demonstrate, even if the
219. See Physician Advertising, BVerfGE 71, 162 (1985); Pharmacy Advertising,
BVerfGE 53, 96 (1980). These results stand in stark contrast with cases like Edenfield V
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993), and Vginia State Board ofPharmacy v Viginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976), which protect the ability of accountants
and pharmacies, respectively, to advertise their products and services.
220. See, e.g., Communist Party Ban, BVerfGE 5, 85 (1956); Socialist Reich Party
Ban, BVerfGE 2, 1 (1952), tanslatedinKOMMERS, supanote 8, at 218.
221. See, e.g., Auschwitz Lie (Holocaust Denial), BVerfGE 90, 241 (1994), translated
M 2 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 621-30.
222. Whitman, supianote 191, at 1310.
223. Id
224. Id.
225. See id.
at 1310-12.
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expression does not transgress an individual's or group's interest in
dignity, the content and viewpoint of the speech most definitely matter
in Germany.
A.

Liith: Free Speech Triumphant?

Lt 2 26 is an important case for many reasons. Professor
Kommers describes it as "a linchpin of German constitutional law"
and rightly so. 27 The case establishes the general principle that the
Basic Law applies to all legal disputes, either directly or indirectly. 8 It
also "laid down for the first time the doctrine of an objective order of
values.,129 Finally, the case serves
as the foundation for German free
2°
speech doctrine more generally.
Veit Harlan, a film director, worked closely with the Nazi
propaganda machine.
In this capacity, he produced and directed a
number of highly offensive films, most notably including the
infamously anti-Semitic film Jud Siiss (The Jew Seuss).232
Notwithstanding his active collaboration with the Nazi government,
the Allies never convicted Harlan of any war crimes for his
contributions to the Nazis' genocidal programs. 3
Following the end of World War II, he attempted to reemerge as a
mainstream director.3
In 1950, he wrote and directed the film
Immortal Belove4 which was released to favorable critical notices
both in Germany and abroad.2 '
Erich Liith, Hamburg's director of information, was incensed 2at6
Harlan's reemergence into the world of cinema as a legitimate auteur.
Liith, acting in his private capacity as a citizen, organized a nationwide
boycott of Harlan's film.237 Domnick-Fim-Produktion GmbH, the
film's producer, and Herzog-Film GmbH, the film's distributor in
Germany, then sought an injunction against the boycott under a general
226. Liith, BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958), translated in 2 DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 1-20; see also KOMMERS, supra note 8, at
361-69 (excerpting and translating the case).
227. SeeKOMMERS, supranote 8, at 361.
228. See supa notes 8-18 and accompanying text.
229. KOMMERS, supra note 8, at 361.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See id.
See id
Seeid
See id at 361-62.
Seeid at 362.
See id
Seeid
See id.
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provision of the German Civil Code. 38 A local trial court in Hamburg
found in favor of the producer and distributor and enjoined Liith from
pursuing the boycott.239 The injunction prohibited Lith from "calling
on German cinema owners and film distributors not to include the film
'Immortal Beloved' in their programme"' 4°and from "calling on the
German public not to go and see the film.
After this adverse judgment, Liith filed an appeal with the
Regional Court, which he lost. 4' He then filed simultaneous appeals
with the Regional Appeals Court and the Federal Constitutional Court,
alleging a violation of his rights under Article 5 of the Basic Law.2 2
The German Constitutional Court began its analysis by noting
that the Basic Law creates a system of rights that is not "neutral as to
values" and that erects "an objective value system in its section on
fundamental rights." 43 Dignity "must be regarded as the basic
constitutional decision for all spheres of law," and this commitment to
dignity "manifestly influences the civil law: no provision of civil law
may be in contradiction with it; each one must be interpreted in its
spirit ' " This effect on private law is particularly appropriate in the
context of the "general clauses" of the Civil Code which 'serve
as the
24'
law.
civil
to
in'
'break
rights
fundamental
the
"points where
Although Article 5(2) limits the freedom of speech when required
by the general laws, the general laws themselves must be interpreted
consistently with the Basic Law. Thus, there is a kind of symbiotic
relationship between the Basic Law and the Civil Code:
[T]he general laws must themselves be interpreted as far as their effect
of restricting the fundamental rights goes in the light of the importance
of that fundamental right, . . . which in a free democracy must lead to a
basic presumption in favour of freedom of speech in all areas but
particularly in public life.246
The Federal Constitutional Court extols the value and importance
of free speech, describing it "as the most direct expression of human
238. See id The provision, section 826, provides that "[w]hoever causes damages to
another person intentionally and in a manner offensive to good morals is obligated to
compensate the other person for the damage." See id. at 362 (internal quotations omitted).

239. See Lith, BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958), translatedin2
(pt. 1), supra note 23, at 3.

CONSTITuTIONAL COuRT

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id.
See id.
Id.at 3-4.
Idat 5.
Id.
Id.
Id at 7.
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personality in society, one of the foremost human rights of all."24 7 The
Court explains that
[flor a free democratic State system, it is nothing other than
constitutive, for it is only through it that the constant intellectual debate,
the clash of opinions, that is its vital element is made possible.... It is
in a certain sense the basis of every freedom whatever, "the matrix,
2 8 the
indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."
This language strongly foreshadowed the ultimate result in the case,
which was favorable to Liith.
The Constitutional Court found that the lower courts had failed to
consider adequately Liith's interest in self-expression when applying
section 826 of the Civil Code. 29 The trial judge must "in each case ...
weigh the importance of the fundamental right against the value of the
legal good protected in the 'general law' for the person allegedly
injured by the utterance., 25" The Court emphasized that "[t]he decision
can be taken only on the basis of an overall view of the individual case,
taking all essential circumstances into account."25'
The Federal Constitutional Court went on to engage in a
balancing of the plaintiffs' interests in being free from economic
coercion and lost profits against LUith's interest in freedom of
expression.252 The Court found that Liith acted in good faith and on the
basis of a sincere political conviction that Veit Harlan should not be
permitted to simply resume his professional life, given the appearance
this would create to the larger world, i.e., "that nothing had changed in
German cultural life by comparison with the National Socialist period;
with Harlan now again, as then, the representative German film
director." 53
The Court noted that the German government benefited from
LUith's speech: "There is therefore a decisive interest in having the
world assured that the German people has turned away from this
mental attitude and condemns it not merely for reasons of political
opportunism but from insight into its contemptibility, gained from their
own inner conversion." '4 . In other words, Liith's boycott represented a

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id
Id (quoting Justice Cardozo).
Seeid. at 20.
Id.
at 9.
Id.
Seeid at 9-20.
Id at 11.
Id.
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source of good publicity for both the West German government and
the German people as a whole.
As for Harlan's interest in reintegration into society, pursuit of his
career, and, moreover, his personal dignity and reputation? The
Federal Constitutional Court posited counterspeech as an effective
remedy for any harm to these interests that Liith's activity caused:
"Anyone who feels injured by a public statement of another can
similarly reply before the public."2 5' In fact, the Regional Court had
applied Article 2, which protects the free development of individual
personality, to sustain the trial court's judgment. 56 The Constitutional
Court was far less interested in protecting Harlan's Article 2 (or Article
1) rights.57 If the boycott ended Harlan's career as a film director, "he
would still nevertheless have other possibilities of artistic activity ...
be no talk of a total annihilation of his artistic and
so that there could
2 8
human existence.

Liith's remarks against Harlan even contained arguable factual
mistakes: "[T]he complainant had made the objectively untrue
assertion that Harlan had been only formally acquitted by the Court of
Assizes, while the grounds of judgment had been a moral
condemnation.""2 9 Recall that false assertions of fact supposedly have
no call, whatsoever, on Article 5. In the context of sham interviews,
erroneous quotation marks, and quotes taken out of context, the
Constitutional Court flatly denied any protection to the speaker.
Liith's statements were at best inaccurate and at worst total
mischaracterizations. The Federal Constitutional Court found that the
war crimes court judgment
goes on to explain in detail that at the time when Harlan was ordered to
make the film there had scarcely been any further possibilities for him
of avoiding cooperation, sabotaging the film or significantly
moderating its anti-semitic content; it is explicitly attested that he had at
least attempted the latter.260
Harlan's activities constituted a "crime against humanity" but were
excused because he was simply following orders and would have faced

255. Id.at 13.
256. See id
257. See id
258. Id.at 14.
259. Id.Later the Court described the findings of the Court of Assizes, which found
Harlan had no choice but to make the Nazi films and that he attempted, to the extent possible,
at 14-18.
to sabotage his work product for the National Socialist government. See id.
at 17.
260. Id.
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personal danger "to life and limb" if he refused to work for the Nazi
government."
Lith simplified a rather complicated verdict into the statement
that "[h]is acquittal in Hamburg was purely a formal one" and "[t]he
grounds of judgment were a moral condemnation. ' This sort of spin
fails to pass muster in later cases. Indeed, even an accurate quotation,
taken out of context, gives rise to a private action for damages in
BJJ. 263 So why does the German Constitutional Court excuse Lilth
from observing the standard of care it demands of others?
The reason is as simple as it is startling: Liith's speech helped
contribute to Germany's reemergence as a legitimate nation state and
therefore deserved protection."6 Indeed, the Federal Constitutional
Court takes pains to note that his speech closely corresponded to a
speech in the Bundestag condemning Harlan's reemergence as a film
director."' The correspondence of views was a felicitous one: "In
assessing the conduct of the complainant, the view of the
representative body of the German people expressed here cannot be
irrelevant."2 6' Simply put, speech critical of Nazi collaborators or those
who supported them is broadly protected, at least insofar as the
government itself agrees with the speaker's characterization of the
object of the accusation. The best way to win an Article 5 case before
the German Constitutional Court is to attack a known Nazi. But, one
should not draw any broad generalizations from the result in Lath.
Instead, it merely represents the viewpoint-based jurisprudence of
Article 5.
Not only does German law protect those who trash the Nazis, it
also generally prohibits political speech that endorses or supports
Nationalist Socialist ideologies. The best way to lose a free speech
claim is to embrace antidemocratic values or anti-Semitic ideologies.
Simply put, certain ideas enjoy virtually no legal protection in German
constitutional law. The cases that follow demonstrate the oddity of
Liith and the strength of the countervailing censorial tradition.

261. Id. at 18.
262. Id. at 2.
263. See BVerfGE 54, 208 (1980), translated i7 2 DECISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1), supranote 23, at 189-98.
264. See Liith, BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958), translatedin 2 DECISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 1), supranote 23, at 19-20.
265. See id.
266. Id at 20.
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Socialist Reich Party andCommunist Party Ban: The 'Militant
Democracy"inAction

As noted in the introduction, the Basic Law itself proscribes
activities aimed at the overthrow of the democratic constitutional order.
Although Article 9 generally protects the freedom of association, this
protection does not extend to those associations "whose purposes or
activities ... are directed against the constitutional order."26 ' Similarly,

Article 18 declares free speech fights null and void for "abuse" if
'
Finally,
deployed "to combat the free democratic basic order."268
Article 21 prohibits the existence of political parties "that, by reason of
their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or abolish
the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the
Federal Republic of Germany."269 These three provisions collectively
establish that constitutional freedoms that otherwise enjoy protection
under the Basic Law lose such protection if deployed in an effort to
disestablish the "free democratic basic order." Article 5 does not itself
contain this proviso, but Articles 9, 18, and 21 clearly establish that the
freedom of speech does not extend to speech aimed at promoting the
overthrow of the government.
In a pair of cases decided in the 1950s, the Federal Constitutional
Court enforced bans against the Socialist Reich Party and the
Communist Party. Although these decisions appear rather extreme
when contrasted with the Brandenburgfree speech orthodoxy that has
prevailed in the United States since 1969, one cannot really fault the
Constitutional Court for enforcing the express textual limitations that
the Basic Law itself establishes.
In Socialist Reich Party Ban (SRP), the government petitioned
the Constitutional Court to ban the SRP under Article 21(2) of the
Basic Law. ° The Court recognized the inherent contradiction of
positing full democracy with limitations on electoral speech.' It noted
that "the principle of democracy" requires freedom for "any political
orientation to manifest itself in political parties, including-to be
' The nature of serving as a
consistent-anti-democratic orientations." 72
267. GG art. 9(2) (ER.G.).

268. Id. art. 18.
269. Id. art. 21(2). For a very helpful discussion of political parties and their role in
the constitutional order that the Basic Law establishes, see CURM, supM note 8, at 207-13.
270. See BVerfGE 2, 1 (1952), tanslatedinKMMERs, supa note 8, at 218.
271.

Seeidat219.

272. Id.The Federal Constitutional Court has not offered translations of either the
Socialist Reich PartyBan or Communist PartyBan cases. Accordingly, citations are to the

Kommers translations.
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democratic representative also implies the ability "to be a free
representative of the entire people and at the same time be bound by a
concrete party program."273 "Both fundamental ideas lead to the basic
conclusion that the establishment and activity of political parties must
not be restrained."274
Banning antidemocratic political organizations violates both
principles-something that the Constitutional Court found deeply
problematic.275 It noted that "[t]he Framers of the German Constitution
had to decide whether they could fully implement this conclusion or
whether, enlightened by recent experiences, they should instead draw
certain limits in this area."2 6 Article 21(2) and Article 9 resolve this
question in favor of limiting the full freedom of association, whether
by political parties or other groups, in order to safeguard the
7
democratic constitutional order."
Consistent with Article 21(2), the
Constitutional Court may ban a party "if, but only if, they seek to
topple supreme fundamental values of the free democratic order which
278
are embodied in the Basic Law.
After examining the membership of the SRP, its objectives and
platform, and its internal structure, the Constitutional Court concluded
that it represented a de facto proxy for the Nazi Party and, therefore,
fell within the ban Article 21(2) establishes.2 79 Accordingly, it held that
"[t]he SRP is thus unconstitutional within the meaning of Article 21(2)
of the Basic Law" and "must be dissolved."80
Four years later, the Federal Constitutional Court issued a decree
banning the Community Party (or KPD). 8 ' Professor Kommers
reports that "[t]he court found, as a matter of ideology and fact, that the
KPD directed all of its operations against the existing constitutional
system. 1
Itcautioned that the mere abstract advocacy of the
overthrow of the government was not a sufficient condition for
banning a political party.283 Instead, the party must have "a fixed
purpose constantly and resolutely to combat the free democratic basic
273. Id.
274. Id
275. See id.
276. Id.
277. Seeid. at 220.
278. Id.
279. See id. at 220-22.
280. Id.
at 222.
281. Communist Party Ban, BVerfGE 5, 85 (1956), translatedinKOMMERS, supm note
8, at 222-23.
282. Id.at 223.
283. See id
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pursue this agenda "in political action according to a
order" and must
28
plan.,
fixed
Although the Basic Law establishes a democratic constitutional
order, its framers did not intend to tolerate any and all political
agendas. The framers, "based on their concrete historical experience,"
concluded that "the state could no longer afford to maintain an attitude
of neutrality toward political parties. 285 The Basic Law thus
establishes a "militant democracy," which the Federal Constitutional
Court has an obligation to defend and maintain.286 In light of its
finding that the KPD sought to overthrow the democratic basic order,
Court ordered its dissolution and confiscation of its
the Constitutional
287
property.
The Federal Constitutional Court has been less strict in its
enforcement of Article 21(2) since the 1970s, but the government
retains the power to abolish any party that it deems a sufficient threat
to the existing constitutional order. Kommers notes that "the level of
tolerance for extremist political speech and activity appears to have
gained confidence in
risen in the Federal Republic as Germans have
211
processes.
and
institutions
democratic
their
That said, one should not assume that the contemporary German
government maintains a weakened commitment to "militant
democracy." In many cases, a band of lunatics with little electoral
support probably would benefit more from a government ban than
suffer from it. The German government's behavior thus reflects much
greater tolerance for extremist parties that show little sign of garnering
significant electoral support. But, make no mistake, the toleration
reflects pragmatism rather than an absolute commitment to entirely
free and open democratic politics. 29 As Professor Currie notes, the
government moved to invoke its powers to suppress organizations
dedicated to overthrow of the democratic order in the immediate
aftermath of German reunification because of "a rash of violent
attacks on foreigners" that "reached alarming proportions."29"

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
See id (internal quotations omitted).
See id
Id.at 236.
at 236-37.
See id.
See CURRIE, supranote 8, at 221.
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Auschwitz Lie (HolocaustDenia):The Exclusion ofFalseIdeas
from Aicle 5 ' Protecton

In the United States, "[u]nder the First Amendment there is no
such thing as a false idea."29 ' As Professor Martin Redish has noted,
"the Supreme Court has adopted as its doctrinal baseline the principle
that the government may not constitutionally regulate private
expression because it disagrees with the viewpoints expressed."" 2
Thus, "[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its
correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas. 293
Under the Basic Law, Germany takes a somewhat more hands-on
approach to demonstrably false speech. The Auschwitz Lie case
incorporates and reflects the German view that some ideas are both
demonstrably false and sufficiently evil to justify an immediate
government response to suppress them.9
The facts of the case are relatively simple. The National
Democratic Party (NDP) planned on staging a rally in Munich, at
which David Irving, a self-styled "revisionist historian" and known
Holocaust denier, would present the keynote address. 295 The local
government threatened the NDP with criminal prosecution unless it
promised to take "appropriate measures" to ensure that the fact of the
Holocaust would not be denied.2"6 The German administrative courts
upheld the restrictions on the theory that a law prohibiting the denial of
the Holocaust was presumptively constitutional and did not violate
Article 5.297 The NDP appealed these adverse decisions to the Federal
Constitutional Court, alleging a breach of Article 5(1).298
The Federal Constitutional Court easily concluded that "[t]he
contested decisions do not violate Art. 5(l). "299 It explained that Article
5(1) protects the expression of opinions because "[o]pinions are
marked by the individual's subjective relationship to his statement's
291. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
292. Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Fre
Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-EducationalParadox,88 CORNELL L. REV.
62, 74-75 (2002).
293. Gertz,418 U.S. at 339-40.
294. See Auschwitz Lie (Holocaust Denial), BVerfGE 90, 241 (1994), tanslatedin 2
DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 621.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. Seeid.at 622-23.
298. Seeid at 625.
299. Id.at 624.

TULANE LA WREVIEW

1594

[Vol. 78:1549

content" and "[t]o this extent, demonstration of their truth or untruth is
impossible.""3 ' On the other hand, "factual assertions are not, strictly
3 1
speaking, expressions of opinion.""

Factual assertions feature an

"objective relationship between the utterance and reality" that permits
30 2
an objective observer to ascertain "their truth or falsity."
Factual assertions that "cannot contribute anything to the
constitutionally presupposed formation of opinion" do not enjoy any
"Viewed from this angle, incorrect
Article 5(1) protection.
This is
information is not an interest that merits protection. '
particularly true when the false statements cause injury to reputation
interests protected by Article 5(2) and dignitary interests safeguarded
by Article 1. The Court explained that "where an expression of
opinion must be viewed as a formal criminal insult or vilification,
protection of personality routinely comes before freedom of
expression., 315 It went on to find that the prohibited statements were
both factually untrue and caused harm to the reputation and dignity of
Holocaust survivors and their families.3 6
The contrast with Liith is startling. 111th, one should recall,
misrepresented facts regarding Veit Harlan's acquittal by the Court of
Assizes in his speeches calling for a boycott of ImmortalBeloved The
Constitutional Court simply glossed over these inaccuracies in
sustaining Lith's Article 5(1) claim. David Irving and the NDP do not
receive the same solicitous consideration. Why? Because the German
government supported the views and attitudes espoused by Liith and
detests and opposes the views expressed by Mr. Irving and the NDP It
is a simple case of state-enforced viewpoint discrimination. Again,
however, one should keep in mind that the Basic Law itself strikes this
balance-to a large extent, the Federal Constitutional Court is simply

300. Id. at 625.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id; cf Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (holding that the

government may not endeavor to declare truth and suppress falsehoods, but must instead rely
on the marketplace of ideas to resolve any problems that false statements might cause if the
speech involves a public figure or matter of public concern).
305. Auschwitz Lie (Holocaust Denial), BVerfGE 90, 241 (1994), translated in 2
DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 626 (citation

omitted).
306. See id. at 626-30. For a comprehensive review of Germany's laws prohibiting
Holocaust denial and their history, see Eric Stein, HistoryAgainst Free Speech: The New

German LawAgainstthe "'Auschwitz"--AndOther-"Lies'"85 MICH. L. REv. 277, 277-324
(1986).
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enforcing limits that the text of the German Constitution itself
establishes.
D

Nazi Symbols: ViewpointBased Protectionsfor PolicalSpeech

To bring matters to a fitting close, one should note that the
German government does not proscribe all uses or displays of Nazi
symbols. It only prohibits the display of such symbols by those who
appear to support or sympathize with the Third Reich and its antiSemitic and racist policies. The Nazi Symbold7 case makes clear that
the attitude of the person using Nazi iconography will prefigure the
protected or unprotected nature of the speech.
In the Nazi Symbols case, the complainants produced satirical tshirts featuring "Adolph Hitler's body in a uniform jacket with a
swastika armband" and "his body appear[ed] sideways in front of a
3 8 Hitler's name appeared
map outline of Europe.""
over his image, with
the dates "1939" and "1945" appearing to either side of the image; in
gothic lettering under this picture the phrase "European Tour"
appeared, with a series of dates and countries corresponding to the
German conquest and occupation of various European nations during
World War 11.3"9 The September 1940 entry for "England" and the
August 1942 entry for "Russia" both featured a strike out over the
country's name and the notation "Cancelled" in the margin.3 The
copyright lists "Third Reich Promotions" as the tour promoter." A
second t-shirt featured Hitler with a yo-yo and the caption, "European
Yo-Yo Champion, 1939-1945."' 2 The complainants sold 156 t-shirts:
3' 13
"153 with the first picture and 3 with the second picture."
The trial court convicted the complainants of using the symbol of
an unconstitutional organization, in violation of section 86 of the
Criminal Code, and sentenced each of them to pay a fine. The t-shirt
company's owners unsuccessfully appealed the conviction to the
Regional Court and the Bavarian State Supreme Court.3 4 Evidently,
the concept of sarcasm was lost on the lower courts. The defendants

307. BVerfGE

82,

1 (1990),

tanslated in 2

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 458.

308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

Id at 459.
Id.
Id.
Id
Seeid.
Id
See id. at 459-60.
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then filed an appeal with the Federal Constitutional Court, alleging
(3).3"5
infringement of their rights under Article 5(1) and

The Federal Constitutional Court found that the complainants'
argument had merit on Article 5(3) grounds.1 6 It noted that "[t]he
Regional Court failed to appreciate the artistic content of the pictures":
The assumption that an "informed observer" could not see any
derision or ridicule of Hitler inthe pictures and that in the first picture a
"reasonable average citizen" could only recognize a chronological list
of the campaigns, the failure of the attacks against England and Russia
as well as317Hitler's end, does not do justice to the content of the
portrayals.

The same conclusion applied with respect to the "yo-yo" Hitler t-shirt.
"Contrary to the Regional Court's opinion both pictures are open to the
interpretation that Hitler and his megalomania are intended to be
ridiculed by using satire., 318 The t-shirts enjoyed protection, not as
political speech or opinion, but as art. 19
This decision is, at least superficially, free speech friendly. But
on a deeper level, it is more disturbing than reassuring. The
complainants win their case only because the Constitutional Court
accepted their characterization of the t-shirts as disparaging of Hitler.
Had the NDP produced t-shirts with heroic Hitler dressed in classical
garb, convictions under Section 86 would undoubtedly have stood.
Would the t-shirts have been any less "artistic"? Not really. But the tshirts would have conveyed the wrong message about Hitler-they
would have transmitted an officially proscribed viewpoint. As such,
the Basic Law would not have stood as an impediment to civil or
criminal punishments.
It is certainly true that "free speech" is not truly free anywhere.
Every nation maintains some limits on the scope of lawful expression.
For example, an attempt to "joke" with an airport security guard will
lead to criminal punishment very quickly in the United States. But the
scope of permissible speech in Germany seems remarkably limited.
The government has arrogated to itself the power to ban bad ideas and
organizations that attempt to disseminate bad ideas. The system
reflects scant trust in the good sense of the German people to separate
wheat from chaff in the marketplace of ideas.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Seeidat460.
Seeid at46t.
Id.
Id.
at 462.
See id.
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From an American perspective, speech is not really "free" at all in
Germany. The government maintains strict editorial control over core
political speech, and, for the most part, these restrictions are
aggressively enforced. One cannot legally sell copies of Mein Kampf
either in Germany or to Germans in Germany and Web sites featuring
prohibited political ideas give rise to criminal prosecutions. 20 The
German government's efforts to eradicate disfavored political
viewpoints has not abated-its campaign against German language
neo-Nazi Web sites continues into the present. 2 ' Although the German
government may be somewhat less eager to ban parties formally, it has
not abated its efforts to suppress publication of pro-Nazi sentiments.
In sum, these efforts are both content- and viewpoint-based
censorship and reflect a radical break with the free speech tradition in
the United States. Given the continuing problems the German
government faces with extreme right wing parties and politicians, it
should perhaps reexamine whether its program of official government
censorship is doing more good than harm. Regardless of whether the
censorial approach is consistent with democratic self-government, as a
practical matter it does not seem to be very effective at suppressing
racist and xenophobic viewpoints. 22 As Professor Currie delicately
states the matter: "[t]hose who believe in constitutional liberties will
continue to differ as to whether such measures [as prohibitions on
extremist parties and their rhetoric] are appropriate means of
protecting them."2
IV

AN IMPERFECT EQUALITY: SPEECH RESTRICTIONS AS A (POOR)

SUBSTITUTE FOR EQUAL CITIZENSHIP

The German Federal Constitutional Court has broken important
new ground in free speech theory. The Justices have squarely rejected
the marketplace metaphor, not merely endorsing, but effectively
320. See Peter Finn, Neo-Nazis Sheltering Web Sites in the US., WASH. POST, Dec.
12, 2000, at Al.
321. See id; see also John E McGuire, Note, When Speech Is HeardAround the
World Internet Content Regulation in the United States and Germany, 74 N.YU.L. REV.
750, 768-71 (1999) (describing contemporary efforts by the German government to regulate
internet content both domestically and with regard to Web sites located abroad but accessible
by German citizens).
322. See David A. Jacobs, Recent Development, The Ban of Neo-Nazi Music:
Germany Takes on the Neo-Nazis, 34 HARv. INT'L L.J. 563, 563-64, 567-68 (1993) (noting
that "Germany has recently experienced an alarming rise in neo-Nazi and right-wing violence
against foreigners and Jewish memorials," and reporting recent statistics involving hate
crimes in Germany).
323.

See CURRIE, supm note 8, at 221.
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requiring government to police speech that transgresses the dignity
guarantee and to proscribe and punish speech, speakers, and
organizations that advocate the overthrow of the democratic social
order. The German Constitutional Court's free speech jurisprudence
utterly fails to embrace a marketplace of ideas-to the extent that a
marketplace of ideas exists in Germany, all ideas are subject to
government control not only for their content and viewpoint, but, by
virtue of the dignity clause, for the manner in which a speaker chooses
to express an idea or viewpoint.
If speech is a "preferred" freedom in the United States,324 it
represents a dispreferred freedom in Germany. Constitutional
objectives associated with dignity and the survival of contemporary
government institutions routinely supersede the Article 5 right to
freedom of expression. German constitutional law intentionally
subordinates the freedom of expression in order to promote values
associated with dignity, community, and support for democratic selfgovernment. As Professor Eberle has noted, "[t]he German vision, set
out with reasonable clarity and reflecting the systemization of German
legal science, centers around the human person and her dignity....""
Although the marketplace approach that generally prevails in the
United States is certainly subject to serious criticisms, 26 the German
approach seems to fail in several key respects. The Basic Law has
criminalized speech advocating the overthrow of the existing
constitutional order; nevertheless, citizens have continued to join
organizations having this objective. Over fifty years of censorship
have failed to get the job done. Reports of anti-Semitism and acts of
violence against ethnic minorities in Germany continue to abound,
particularly in the parts of Germany formerly comprising the German
Democratic Republic." 7 The use of a speech ban as a means of
324. See generally McGuire, supra note 321, at 753 & n.10 (collecting cases and
noting that "[i]n both theory and practice, speech is considered the most fundamental of
rights in the United States").
325. Eberle, supranote 24, at 1049.
326. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 1-4 (1996) (arguing that
government regulations are necessary to ensure that monied interests do not use wealth to
essentially buy up the marketplace of ideas); CAss R. SUNSTEN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 241-52 (1993) (arguing that private market forces may not serve

democratic self-government very well and that government might need to assume some
responsibility for regulating, and hence shaping, the marketplace of ideas).
327. See David E. Weiss, Note, Stiking a DiflficultBalance: Combattingthe Threat of
Neo-Nazism in Germany While PreservingIndvidual Liberties, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
899, 912-13 (1994) (describing the Rostock antiiummigrant riots of 1992 and the German

government's response to the riots).
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eradicating bad ideas has, as an empirical matter, simply failed to
work. Moreover, the aggressive use of criminal law to ban parties and
politicians espousing the wrong ideas serves only to lionize racist
thugs and, by imbuing the ideology of hate with a strong musk of the
taboo, to make such ideologies intrinsically more appealing to
Germany's youth.
The failure of the speech ban is not really surprising. Banning
speech as a primary effort to create an egalitarian society seems an odd
approach. Consider, for example, Germany's restrictive citizenship
laws. Since World War II, Germany has maintained a very liberal
policy on immigration and asylum, while restricting citizenship on the
basis of blood. As of 2002, some 7.3 million residents, representing
fully nine percent of Germany's population, were legal foreign
residents. 28 Of these noncitizen, permanent residents of Germany,
2,500,000 are Turks. 29 Until very recently, however, only the natural or
adopted children of German citizens were entitled to claim German
citizenship; birth on German soil did not (and still, standing alone,
does not) automatically convey German citizenship.
The results of these two policies-relatively open immigration
coupled with highly restrictive naturalization laws -are not difficult to
predict: the establishment of a permanent underclass of noncitizen
nationals, people born, educated, and employed in Germany who had
no right to participate in civic affairs. Their presence served as an
irritant to Germans enjoying citizenship--something that, in a
democratic society, politicians are bound to notice. Meanwhile, the
noncitizen nationals had no ability themselves to participate in the
electoral process by supporting candidates sympathetic to their plight.
As one commentator has observed, "[o]ne possible means of
ensuring the protection of foreigners would be to grant foreigners
easier access to citizenship and thus to voting rights"33° The German
Constitutional Court, however, has held that it is unconstitutional to
grant voting rights to noncitizens in federal, state, and local elections. 3 '
328. See Steven Erlanger, Bill Easing Immgration Passes First Test in German
Parliament N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2002, at A5.
329. Id.
330. Jacobs, supra note 322, at 576.
331. Id.at 576 n.85 (collecting and citing cases); see also Kay Hailbronner, Fily Years
of the Basic Law-Migntion, Citizenship, and Asylum, 53 SMU L. REv. 519, 527 (2000)
(noting that "[tihe Constitutional Court, in a landmark decision of October 31, 1990, ...
struck down the Hamburg law [extending voting fights to resident noncitizens] as
unconstitutional," and observing that "[b]y reforming the citizenship law, the legislature can
react to factual changes in the population of the Federal Republic of Germany").
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Accordingly, the extension of voting rights would require liberalization
of citizenship rules.
Until the enactment of major naturalization reforms in 1999,
which took effect in 2000, German citizenship rested on jus sanguzis,
or a child's bloodline: "for a child to be born a German citizen, one of
his or her parents must be German."332 Naturalization was highly
disfavored and constituted "an exception based on full integration into
German society and the public interest."333 Thus, Germany maintained
"a 'Vflkisch' view of nationality based on blood rather than a liberal,
republican view of citizenship."334
In practice, these restrictive rules could lead to absurd results:
This law has two important consequences. First, the child of nonnaturalized Turkish parents in their third generation in Germany is born
a Turkish citizen. Second, the child of [a] Polish couple whose parents
and grandparents have never seen Germany and speak no German but
are of German descent has the automatic right to German citizenship.
Germany, Austria, and Luxembourg are the only three countries in
Europe that still determine citizenship by bloodline.... Although there
may be a rational explanation for basing German citizenship on
descent, the message is clear: the color of your blood is what being
German is all about, and foreigners' blood is not the right color.333

Ironically, then, the German government maintained a citizenship
policy that appeared to use troublesome racial stereotypes while at the
same time it aggressively attempted to suppress potentially
embarrassing displays of Nazi symbols.
Thus, the German

332. Jacobs, supra note 322, at 577; see also Ediberto Romdn, Members and
Outsiders. An Examination of the Models of Umted States Citizenshipas Well as Questions
ConcerningEuropean Union Citizenship, 9 U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 81, 112 (2000)
("Germany has a history of onerous and restrictive naturalization laws for foreigners.").
333. Jacobs, supra note 322, at 577; see Edmund L. Andrews, German Lrnmigration
Bill Wins Disputed Vote, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 23, 2002, at A3. As Edmund Andrews of the New
York Times reports:
For decades, even when Germany recruited millions of 'guest workers' in the
1950's and 1960's, German leaders insisted that theirs was not 'an immigration
country' and made it nearly impossible for foreigners to become citizens. Now,
with more than seven million resident foreigners, or 9 percent of the total
population, Germany is already a nation of immigrants.
Andrews, supra, at A3.
334. Roger Cohen, The German 'Volk'Seem Set to Let Outsiders in,N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
16, 1998, atA4.
335. Jacobs, supra note 322, at 577 (footnotes omitted); see also Cohen, supra note
334, at A4 ("Many people have a rooted image of Germany as a blood community." (quoting
sociologist Hartmut Esser)).
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government sent a highly mixed message by denying full civic
participation to third-generation, permanent-resident noncitizens.
In a bold and somewhat politically risky move,"' Chancellor
Gerhard Schr6der successfully advocated the overhaul of Germany's
naturalization law, which dated back to 1913."' These reforms passed
the federal Parliament on July 15, 1999, and took effect on January 1,
2000.3 Under the reforms, "children born in Germany to foreign
parents acquire German citizenship by birth, provided that one parent
has been a permanent resident in Germany for at least eight years and
has a permanent residence permit. 339 However, the child's German
citizenship is only provisional; the child must make an election
between German citizenship and her parent's citizenship between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-three.34 ° German nationality is lost
automatically if a dual national reaches the age of twenty-three without
having renounced any other citizenship or claim to citizenship. 4 ' In
addition, the law reduced the naturalization waiting period for adult
immigrants from fifteen years to eight years. '
336. See David A. Martin, New Rules on DualNationalityfora DemocratizingGlobe:
Between Rejecdon and Embrace, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3 (1999) (noting that the reform
"bill triggered such heated opposition that it was generally blamed for the Social Democrats'
defeat in a state election in Hesse in February 1999," and observing that this loss cost the
party control of the Bundesrat, or upper house of the German federal parliament, which in
turn required that the provisions of the naturalization reform bill be weakened in order to pass
in the upper house).
337. See Daniel Boettcher, Current Development, German Government Considers
Changing Citizenshp Laws, But Oiginal Proposals Meet Fierce Opposition, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339-40 (1999).
338. Staatsangeh6rigkeitsgesetz (Citizenship Law), B0RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH
[BGB] art. 1618 (ER.G.); see Kay Hailbronner, Labor Transfer Schemes-In Whose
NationalInterest? Globalizationand the Transfer of Labor-The European Experience, 16
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 773, 775 (2002); Hailbronner, supra note 331, at 529-31 (discussing
reforms and possible effects on German political community and noting that "[tjhe extension
of German citizenship to children born on German territory to foreigners means a substantial
conceptual change").
339. Hailbronner, supranote 331, at 530.
340. Seeid
341. Id; see also Martin, supra note 336, at 3 n.6 (describing substantive changes in
German citizenship law, including forced election of nationality by age twenty-three forjus
soliGerman citizens).
342. Professor Hailbronner explains that "[floreigners may now acquire German
citizenship after eight years of lawful residence in Germany provided that they: 1) have a
residence permit or a residence entitlement; 2) are not dependent on social welfare; 3) have
no criminal record; and 4) have sufficient knowledge of the German language." Hailbronner,
supra note 338, at 775; see also Hailbronner, supra note 331, at 530-31 ("Foreigners with a
secure residence permit have a right to acquire German citizenship after eight years of
residence instead of the fifteen-year wait period for those without secure resident permits.
This right is dependent upon a sufficient knowledge of the German language and a formal
commitment to respect the Basic Law.").
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Both children born in Germany and foreign nationals seeking to
become naturalized citizens must effectively and affirmatively
renounce any other citizenship which they hold or to which they may
be entitled. Thus, even after the reforms, "there is no automatic path,
or 'tenure track,' that leads to German citizenship."3 '3
Even though citizenship will now be possible for many of the
permanent guest workers and their children, considerable unease
remains among some current German citizens. "For adversaries [of
the reforms], it is a fundamental change endangering the identity of the
German nation."'
For example, Professor Hailbronner expresses
considerable reservations about the possible effects of the
naturalization and citizenship reforms:
The final test will be whether a reform of nationality law will
contribute to the maintenance of the elements stabilizing the "identity"
of the nation. The law would be a fundamental failure if it would lead
to the establishment of national ethnic minorities with privileged
political and social rights. The reform legislation makes clear that
together with the requirement of sufficient German language
knowledge and a commitment to the principles of the Basic Law,
admission to the political community is dependent on the intention to
integrate into German society. '

Thus, German citizenship, even after the reforms, has (or should have)
as much to do with cultural identity as with simply paying one's taxes
and voting.346

343. Hailbronner, supm note 338, at 775.
344. Hailbronner, supranote 331, at 531.
345. Id at 533-34.
346. See Romdn, supra note 332, at 112 ("Foreign individuals seeking German
citizenship have historically had to demonstrate cultural integration, which included fluency
in written and spoken German."); Karin Schemer-Kim, Note, The Role of the Oath of
Renunciation in Current US Nationality Policy-To Enforce, to Omit, or Maybe to
Change, 88 GEo. L.J. 329, 344-47 (2000) (observing the importance of the "need to foster
national cohesion through adherence to common values:' but also noting the importance of
functional aspects of citizenship and the negative effect demands for cultural integration
might have on voluntary naturalization). Given this historical demand for cultural integration
as a condition of full citizenship, it is odd that "[flor decades, German political leaders have
avoided developing effective initiatives geared toward long-term integration of Turkish and
Kurdish immigrants?' Vera Eccarious-Kelly, Radcal Consequences ofBeign Neglect" The
Rise ofthe PKKin Germany,24 FLETCHER E WORLD Are. 161, 161 (2000). Eccarious-Kelly
reports that "[t]his lack of official recognition has prompted descendants of Kurdish and
Turkish immigrants to organize politically in order to increase their domestic influence." Id.
Presumably, this sort of effort to create permanent ethnic voter blocs is exactly the sort of
development that Professor Hailbronner most fears. See supra note 345 and accompanying
text. At least arguably, however, the creation (or maintenance) of an ethnic identity simply

2004]

THE FIRSTAMENDMENT AND GERMANY

1603

Such a requirement of full cultural assimilation undoubtedly
raises the stakes of naturalization. As Professor Martin notes, "pangs
of regret or wonder, emotional ties to the old country, and especially
continuing relations with family still residing there make it impossible
to accomplish a full and complete break."3 7
The liberalized rules governing citizenship should lead to greater
political participation by ethnic minorities in Germany. This, in turn,
should ensure the election of government officials more attuned to the
needs, wants, and desires of these communities. This assumes, of
course, that the immigration reforms will be implemented effectively.
If a complete loss of ethnic identity is a de facto requirement for
naturalization, many persons eligible for citizenship might deem the
price too dear to pay. '
In many ways, the situation prior to the enactment of the
immigration reforms was not entirely unlike that in the American
South in the pre-Voting Rights Act era. Prior to 1965, African
Americans could not vote. This was not a function of citizenship--any
person born on United States soil is a citizen, by virtue of the
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.349 But citizenship, by
itself, does not establish the right to vote. One must register in order to
enjoy suffrage. Thus, if local officials can systematically prevent a
class of persons from registering to vote, the fact that they happen to
be citizens is quite irrelevant.
State and local officials in the states of the former Confederacy
deployed a variety of devices, including poll taxes, literacy tests, and
physical violence, to prevent African-American citizens from voting.
In consequence, politicians seeking office in states with thirty-five
percent minority populations ran as open racists. The electorate was
entirely white, so a politician seeking public office had no need to
address the concerns of the minority community. Indeed, speaking to
such issues virtually ensured electoral defeat.
represents a rational response to the fact of racism and discrimination in contemporary
German society.
347. Martin, supra note 336, at 9.
348. See generally Shlomo Avineri, Comment: Remarks on Michelman and Breyer,
21 CARDOZO L. REv. 1085, 1087 (2000) (arguing that "the current German debate over
citizenship law and naturalization is equally characterized by the lack of solidarity with the
ethnic Turkish population' and noting that "Turkish people, even if born in Germany, are to
many Germans outside the pale of effective solidarity, and hence the debate is really not
about rights, but about identity").
349. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.").

1604

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1549

Whatever his faults (and they were legion), President Lyndon B.
Johnson instinctively realized that the key to meaningful equality in the
South involved reform of the political process. Through sheer
willpower and brass-knuckle political tactics, President Johnson forced
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 through the Congress. Following
passage of the Voting Rights Act, literally millions of AfricanAmerican citizens registered to vote and, in fact, voted. A sea of
change swept the Deep South, as incumbent politicians fell over
themselves trying to show support for the minority community.
Avowed Dixiecrats, such as Senator John C. Stennis of Mississippi and
Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, supported the renewal of the
Voting Rights Act in 1982. The ultimate race baiter, Governor George
C. Wallace of Alabama, had an epiphany and went to a historically
black Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama to seek forgiveness for
his past sins-before seeking an unprecedented fourth term as
Alabama's governor in 1982.350
Thus, the political enfranchisement of minority citizens radically
transformed the political scene. More than any judicial effort to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act of 1965
completed the process of national reconstruction that commenced with
the Civil War in 1861."' The key to equality was not a speech code
that banned the use of racial epithets or prohibited parties that
Instead, the
advocated the maintenance of segregation.
enfranchisement of minority voters led to a transformation of the
region's politics. The state and local governments in the states of the
former Confederacy, once utterly indifferent to the needs and wants of
minority citizens, suddenly exhibited a new solicitousness that
continues to this day. As between a prohibition on hate speech and a
350. See MARSHALL FRADY, WALLACE: THE CLASSIC PORTRAIT OF ALABAMA
GOVERNOR GEORGE WALLACE, 289 (1996) (describing Wallace's 1979 visit to the Dexter
Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, to apologize for his past behavior and seek
forgiveness from those he had wronged in the past); Art Harris, George Wallace s Visions &
Revisions: Wooing Alabama s Voters Away from His Own Pas4 WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1982,
at B1 (describing Wallace's pilgrimage to an African American Baptist church seeking
spiritual and political salvation); see also Caroline Rand Herron, Michael Wright & Carlyle
C. Douglas, George Wallace Leads the Pack in Alabama Vote, N.Y TMES, Sept. 12, 1982,
§ 4, at 4 (noting Wallace's efforts to "court[] Alabama blacks, apologizing for his past racebaiting ways," and reporting that Wallace, seeking "an unprecedented fourth term as
Governor," secured the electoral support of "nearly a third of the state's black voters" in the
1982 Democratic Party state primary election).
351. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., CelebratingSelma: The Importance of Context
in Public Forum Analysis, 104 YALE L.J. 1411, 1414-20, 1426-28 (1995) (describing genesis

of Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its effects on minority participation in federal, state, and
local government after enactment).
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ballot, the leaders of the American Civil Rights Movement would
undoubtedly have preferred the ballot.
Chancellor Gerhard Schr6der's immigration reforms present the
potential of seriously addressing the structural marginalization of
ethnic minorities in Germany. Indeed, over time, the 1999 reforms
may come to play the same role for remaking German society that the
Voting Rights Act played in remaking the American South. The
reforms are a significant and highly important step toward integrating
Germany's multigenerational guest workers (or Gastarbeitet)into the
political life of the nation.352
All that said, however, Germany's hate speech laws are a very
poor proxy for enfranchisement of ethnic minorities. But there is good
reason for this. The hate speech laws are neither designed nor
enforced to empower ethnic minorities. The Basic Law's protection of
dignity privileges members of the dominant cultural group much more
than the average Turk. Moreover, this is not accidental.
As Professor James Q. Whitman has eloquently explained,
German dignity concerns stem from a culture of respect that
democratized aristocratic forms of politesse and protected these
interests through the civil and criminal law.353 "Standing behind both
German and French attitudes toward the regulation of civility is
something else: a commitment to the broad distribution of 'honor' or
'dignity' throughout society.""'
He emphasizes that "[t]hese
Continental systems, in short, have human 'dignity' today largely
35
because they had personal 'honor' in the past.""
The concept of honor, or dignity, goes to personal affront and not
to core concerns with the equality of all persons. Accordingly, posting
a sign in a local bar that states "no Turks allowed" does not necessarily
give rise to a cause of action under the German Civil or Criminal Code
provisions protecting personal honor. Why? Because the total
rejection of another person based on his membership in a particular
racial or ethnic group is not the same as a targeted personal insult.356
Professor Whitman explains:

352. Germany has experienced significant immigration from ostensibly "temporary"
guest workers since the 1960s. See Boettcher, supra note 337, at 339-40. These workers
"were expected to return home after several years' labor in Germany, so neither the Germans
or the Turks made great efforts to integrate." Id.at 340.
353. See Whitman, supranote 191, at 1295-1312, 1327-32, 1381-90.
354. Id at 1384.
355. Id at 1385 (emphasis omitted).
356. See idat 1303, 1310-11.
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It is important to recognize, though, that the broader German
commitment to respectful treatment is somewhat less far-reaching.
Members of other groups [besides Jews]-notably Turks, the focus of
disproportionate hostility in the German public sphere today-are
certainly protected against insults, like all Germans. But allegations of
anti-Turkish insults, unlike allegations of anti-Jewish ones, are
subjected to the usual juristic analysis, that is, to a factual inquiry as to
whether they display an intentional "lack of respect or disrespect" on
the part of the person delivering the insult. This is why bar-owners who
post signs excluding Turks may not have committed an "insult" under
German law: The operative question, under the law of insult, is again
whether the individual bar-owner has indulged in an open and
'
unambiguous display of "his own lack of respect for the victim."357

Thus, Germany's insult and hate speech laws are not really designed
either to create or maintain comprehensive social equality.
For example, if a Turkish woman driving a car gives "the bird" to
a fellow driver after being cut off, the woman, if caught and identified,
could be prosecuted civilly for insult. 58 If the other driver, in response,
called the woman a "Turkish whore," it is far from certain whether a
claim would lie, under either the laws of personal insult or the antihate
speech laws.359 German law simply "does not aim to guarantee an
atmosphere of dignity" or "establish structural ground rules for
respectful interracial relations that will operate regardless of the (everelusive) subjective intent of the persons involved."3"
This explanation helps to square the German legal system's
historical failure to afford full civil rights, including suffrage, to
noncitizen permanent residents. The apparent contradiction is more
imagined than real: the objectives of the civility laws regulating
speech are about protecting personal dignity from direct insult, not
about the creation of an inclusive and egalitarian society. And even
this commitment is somewhat shaky when one focuses on unpopular
immigrant groups, like the Turks. Understood in this way, the failure
(until 2000 in any event) to provide citizenship to literally thousands of
permanent residents and their children becomes a great deal less
puzzling.
357. Idat1310-11.
358. See id at 1296-97 ("In fact, every German knows that anybody who is the target
of any such gesture-for example, 'the finger' or 'the fig'-has the right to call the cops."
(footnote omitted)). For an amusing compendium of potentially actionable insults, see id at
1305-06 n.70.
359. Seeid at 1295-97, 1305 n.70, & 1312 n.88.
360. Id at 1312.
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Does Germany protect the freedom of speech? Undeniably, the
36
answer is "yes.""
But the Federal Constitutional Court has broadly
and consistently declined to afford the freedom of speech the primacy
that it enjoys in the United States. In part, this reflects a constitution
that elevates dignity above free speech and specifically and strictly
limits free speech itself. But, in a broader sense, Germany's treatment
of free speech reflects a broader cultural fact: free speech is less
important to Germans than personal honor. In the United States, there
simply is no comparable legal protection for personal honor or
reputation: "American law has, it must be emphasized, remarkably
little to say about norms of hierarchical respect." 2 Thus, "American
law is just different."363
I would not assert that American free speech law is inherently
superior to German law. The legal systems, and, indeed, both the legal
and broader cultures, achieve different results by design, and not by
accident. It would make little sense to criticize the Constitutional
Court for failing to advance values that the Justices of that Court selfconsciously choose to subordinate to advance other values. One also
would be hard pressed to make a serious case that Germany does not
protect free speech. China does not respect free speech, but Germany
certainly is not China. Although Germany protects less speech than
the United States, a great deal of speech does enjoy formal
constitutional protection.
The German approach deals a serious blow to efforts to establish
a universal definition of "the freedom of speech." Indeed, as Professor
Currie suggests, "[e]xamination of the German law of free expression
reminds one once again how easily two well-intentioned societies,
starting from substantially identical premises, can arrive at
significantly different results."36' German constitutional law defines
free speech in a plausible way and reflects a sophisticated and highly
nuanced jurisprudence. The Constitutional Court has endorsed neither
a "marketplace of ideas" nor a paradigm that absolutely privileges
speech annexed to the project of democratic self-governance.
Free speech, of course, has an important role in self-governance,
but the German Constitutional Court has made clear that free speech
361. See Kiibler, supra note 80, at 375 (observing that understandings of free speech
differ across national legal systems and suggesting "a shared understanding that a reasonable
interpretation of free speech guarantees will allow the prohibition of the most threatening
emanations of racial hatred and dehumanizing propaganda").
362. Whitman, supra note 191, at 1382.
363. Id.
364. CURRIE, supranote 8, at 237.

1608

TULANE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1549

can accomplish this role without reaching hate speech, speech
opposing the basic democratic order, or speech that impinges on
personal dignity and honor. Although one can finds strains of Holmes
and Meiklejohn in the opinions of the Federal Constitutional Court, the
melody is radically different. Outside observers also should take care
not to overstate the German Constitutional Court's equality project.
The limitations on free speech only incidentally advance equality.
Their principal purpose and effect is to advance an overarching civility
project, and the protection of personal reputation represents one piece
of this larger project.
V

CONCLUSION

Consideration of the German example suggests two important
problems that proponents of greater regulation of hate speech in the
United States must address. First, German hate speech regulations are
part and parcel of a larger effort to protect human dignity and personal
honor. Indeed, the subordinated position of free speech significantly
predates adoption of the Basic Law and reflects
cultural values largely
36
States.
United
contemporary
the
in
absent
Second, hate speech laws are a very poor substitute for formal
legal equality. Equal citizenship, now possible thanks to the German
government's recent naturalization reforms, will do more to empower
racial and ethnic minorities in Germany in the years to come than the
hate speech laws have accomplished in several decades.
In
considering how to create an egalitarian society, rules requiring polite
interaction should probably constitute a lesser priority than securing
more basic civil rights, such as suffrage. Simply put, hate speech laws
should not serve as a substitute for formal rights to participate in the
project of democratic deliberation-happily, something that the
German government has acknowledged and acted to remedy.
In sum, critics of the U.S. approach to hate speech regulation
should reconsider carefully whether Germany provides an example
worthy of emulation. One cannot fairly characterize Germany's
speech restrictions as "limited," nor does the overall context of German
speech regulation support the assertion that "limited regulation of hate
speech does not invariably cause deterioration of the respect accorded
free speech." '66 As a matter of causation, Germany's adoption and
enforcement of hate speech laws probably reflect the subordinated
365. See Whitman, supm note 191, at 1395-98.
366. See Stefancic & Delgado, supra note 5, at 742.
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position that free speech enjoys vis-A-vis other interests protected
under the Basic Law, notably including human dignity, personality, and
personal honor. German law elevated these interests above the
freedom of speech before the adoption of the Basic Law and, to a
significant degree, the Basic Law simply built upon a preexisting
tradition.
To be sure, whether, and to what extent, Germany provides a
viable model for the United States to follow is a debatable question.
However, the radical rejection of free speech in the jurisprudence of
the Federal Constitutional Court should give one serious pause about
the suitability of Germany as a possible model for speech regulation in
the United States. The German approach to hate speech is the product
of a legal and cultural milieu that quite intentionally devalues the
freedom of expression in order to advance other interests. One might
well question whether legal regimes that accommodate German
priorities would prove workable in the United States.

